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EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY AFTER THE 2003 CONVENTION
ANNE PETERS*
1. The democratic challenge
1.1. Introduction
“Our Constitution ... is called a democracy because power is in the hands
not of a minority but of the greatest number.” (Thucydides1)
This is the motto of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution by the Euro-
pean Convention of 18 July 20032 (hereafter: Draft Constitution). In prin-
ciple, it suits a European constitution well to invoke Greek antiquity, which
forms an important strand of common European heritage and identity. How-
ever, democratic theorists today agree that the essence of Democracy is not
the majority principle. One the one hand, a functioning democracy needs
much more than majority voting, most importantly a democratic infrastruc-
ture. On the other hand, we might even call a type of governance which rests
in part on non-majoritarian modes of decision-making “democratic”. And fi-
nally, if majority-voting in the various institutions were the decisive test of
democracy, the 2003 Draft Constitution itself would not be very democratic,
although it offers progress in that direction.
Alluding to theory and practice dating back to the times of Thucydides,
one of the most eminent modern theorists of democracy wrote: “Today the
term democracy is like an ancient kitchen midden packed with assorted left-
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1.  Thucydides (471–400 b.C.), History of the Peleponnesian War, Part II, 37 (referring to
the Constitution of Athens under Pericles).
2.  CONV 850/03 (european-convention.eu.int). See for overall assessments of the Draft
Constitution Kokott and Rüth, “The European Convention and its Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe: Appropriate answers to the Laeken questions?”, 40 CML Rev. (2003),
1315–1345; Schwarze, “Ein pragmatischer Verfassungsentwurf – Analyse und Bewertung des
vom Europäischen Verfassungskonvent vorgelegten Entwurfs eines Vertrags über eine
Verfassung für Europa”, 38 EuR (2003), 535–573.
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overs from twenty-five hundred years of nearly continued usage”.3 So our
question today is: What kind of leftovers should be warmed up for the EU4
or should we brew a fresh stew?
This article first looks at the current ideal and reality of democratic gover-
nance in the nation State and at the European level, put under stress by glo-
balization (Part 1). In Part 2, institutional and functional aspects of
democratic governance in Europe are discussed. This includes an analysis of
the democratic reforms introduced by the 2003 Draft Constitution. Part 3
looks at general problems of European democracy beyond the institutional
set-up. In Part 4, some suggestions are made for the future of European
democratic governance, viewed against the Convention’s proposals.
1.2. Current transformation of domestic democracies
Before answering the question “how democratic is Europe?”, the democratic
yardstick must first be explained.5 Any evaluation of the quality of European
democracy as it stands and the evaluation of reform proposals must take into
account the real situation of democracy in the Member States, and not an ab-
stract democratic ideal.6 This means that we need to be aware of the current
and fundamental transformations that the democratic systems in the Member
States are undergoing, transformations that can be characterized with the fol-
lowing key-words:
– rise of the executive branch, due, inter alia, to more denationalized regu-
lation;
– dominance of specialized, non-democratically elected technical experts in
all subject areas of legislation;7
3.  Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven (Conn.), 1982), at 5.
4.  Recent monographs on the subject include Lord, Democracy in the European Union
(Sheffield, 1999); Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, 1999);
Karlsson, Democracy, Legitimacy and the European Union (Uppsala, 2001); MacCormick,
Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford, Clarendon, 1999); Verhoeven, The European Union in
Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory (Kluwer Law International, 2002).
5.  A helpful contribution to a clarification of the yardstick is Lord, “Assessing Democracy
in a Contested Polity”, 39 JCMS (2001), 641–661.
6.  See in this sense Armingeon, “Comment: The Democratic Deficit of the European
Union”, 50 Aussenwirtschaft (1995), 67–76.
7.  A recent example from Germany is the National Council on Ethics (Nationaler Ethikrat),
inaugurated in June 2001 as a national forum for dialogue on ethical issues in the life sciences.
Its (up to 25) members were appointed by the Federal Chancellor (see www.ethikrat.org/
_english/about _us/function.htm). Further examples are the Commission on Immigration
(Zuwanderungskommission, final report handed over to the German Federal Government on 4
July 2001) and the Hartz Commission for the reform of the labour-market, established by the
German Federal Government. See the literature on the “threat” of technocracy Fischer, Tech-
nocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park (Cal.), 1990), at pp. 15–20 and at 30–35;
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– para-legislation in the form of compacts, codes of conduct or agreed stan-
dards and principles;8
– these norms, or “soft laws”, are the result of (horizontal) negotiation, not
of (vertical, top-down) legislation;9
– the circumvention of parliaments by individuals and other interest groups
with the help of new technologies of direct communication and net-work-
ing;10
seminal work of Schelsky, Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation (Cologne, 1961),
at pp. 29–30.
8.  See e.g. the latest recommendations of the German Research Society (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft) on research on human embryonic stem cells of May 2001, which
appear to substitute legislation on that issue (www.dfg.de/english/press/releases/Archive/
presse_2001_16_eng.html). Another example is the German compact for work (“Bündnis für
Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit”), concluded in 1997 by the Federal govern-
ment, representatives of the economy and unions (see www.igmetall.de/buendnis/). In Febru-
ary 2003, the German Corporate Governance Code was issued, drawn up by experts from
different areas of German business (www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/
CorGov_Endfassung_E.pdf). It contains recommendations on standards and disclosure duties
for listed companies for periods of six months. The object of this “soft law” self-commitment
by business is to enhance transparency for investors and to improve the access of the listed
companies to the international financial markets. It purposefully supplements the “hard” Ger-
man Transparency and Disclosure Law.
9.  See in the literature as far back as Eschenburg, Herrschaft der Verbände? (Stuttgart,
1963, orig. 1955), at 32; also Ritter, “Der kooperative Staat: Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von
Staat und Wirtschaft”, 104 AöR (1979), 389, at 410; Scharpf, “Versuch über die Demokratie
im verhandelnden Staat”, in Czada and Schmidt (Eds.), Verhandlungsdemokratie,
Interessenvermittlung, Regierbarkeit: Festschrift für Gerhard Lehmbruch (Opladen, 1993),
pp. 25–50; Grande, “Auflösung, Modernisierung oder Transformation? Zum Wandel des
modernen Staates in Europa”, in Grande and Prätorius (Eds.), Modernisierung des Staates?
(Baden-Baden, 1997) p. 45, at 57. Hence, in economic politics, high-ranking representatives of
the administration and of associations typically negotiate results that are no longer comprehen-
sible for the parliamentary bodies of the territorial units involved. Parliaments can only accept
these results or disavow their representatives. Also, Parliamentary bills are negotiated between
political departments and the lobbies and are presented to parliament without alternatives. In
that situation, either parliamentary control is realized and complicates or prevents the negotia-
tions, or the negotiations are successful and invalidate the democratic procedure (Benz,
“Verhandlungssysteme und Mehrebenenverflechtung im kooperativen Staat”, in Benz and
Seibel (Eds.), Regierungssystem und Verwaltungspolitik: Beiträge zu Ehren von Thomas
Ellwein (Opladen, 1995) p. 83, at 90–91). See also von Beyme, “Niedergang der Parlamente”,
53 Internationale Politik (Opladen, 1998), 21, at 29; von Beyme, Die Parlamentarische
Demokratie: Entstehung und Funktionsweise 1789–1999 (Opladen, 1999), at pp. 537–538 (on
“disempowerment” of the national parliament solely by the amount of issues); Grimm, “Das
Grundgesetz nach 50 Jahren – Versuch einer staatsrechtlichen Würdigung”, in Bundes-
ministerium des Innern (Ed.), Bewährung und Herausforderung: Die Verfassung der Zukunft
(Opladen, 1999), p. 39, at 57–58; Klein, “Staat der Bürger: Zum 50. Jahrestag des
Grundgesetzes”, in ibid. p. 133, at 139 (marginalization of parliament by networks and infor-
mal agreements).
10.  See the relevant contributions in Holznagel, Grünwald and Hanssmann (Eds.),
Elektronische Demokratie: Bürgerbeteiligung per Internet zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis
40 Peters CML Rev. 2004
– a final, crucial factor is the transformation of domestic democracies
through globalization and global governance. I will discuss this last factor
in more detail in the next section.
1.3. Anti-democratic effects of globalization and compensatory
transnational democracy
The European discussion on democracy neglects the global dimension of the
problem.11 Globalization undermines the premise of traditional democratic
theory, namely that democratic States are comparatively closed, clearly de-
finable entities.12 In contrast, economic, political, military and legal prob-
lems, relations and power structures are becoming increasingly global. This
has led to three democratic deficiencies.
The first deficiency stems from the fact that – because of global interde-
pendencies – State activities have become more far-reaching and more extra-
territorial. This means that political decisions (e.g. on tax reduction, raising
environmental standards, building nuclear plants) affect people in other
States, people who have not elected the decision-makers and can in no way
control them.
The second aspect is that the transnational character of issues, and the mo-
bility and interaction of individuals, firms, and NGOs (despite the increas-
ingly extraterritorial effects of regulation) has on the whole reduced the
power of the nation state to tackle and solve problems by itself. In terms of
democracy, this general loss of effectiveness reduces the effectiveness of
self-determination, or democratic output. So here we face a kind of indirect
decline of democracy.13
The third deficiency lies in the lack of any democratic mandate for or con-
trol of non-state decision-makers. In order to regain control, States have to
co-operate within international organizations, through bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties and so forth. But these conventional methods of global gover-
nance aggravate the democratic deficit, because the link between voters and
(Munich, 2001). On the effects of the internet on state authority and parliamentarism see the
excellent analysis by Engel, “Das Internet und der Nationalstaat”, 39 Berichte der Deutschen
Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht (1999), 353, esp. at 374–389.
11.  See in detail Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Berlin, 2001), at
pp. 743–751.
12.  Held, “Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System”, in Held, Political Theory
Today (Cambridge, 1991), p. 197, at 199; Walker, “On the Spatiotemporal Conditions of
Democratic Practice”, 16 Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance
(1991), 243–261; McGrew, “Demokratie ohne Grenzen?”, in Beck (Ed.), Politik der
Globalisierung (Frankfurt a.M.,1998), p. 374, at 381–383.
13.  Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Policy (Cambridge,
1996), at p. 202.
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decision-makers is loosened. Non-state law-making is – not only in the EU,
but in all international institutions – law-making by the executive, not by par-
liament.14 The remaining formal power of parliaments to ratify international
treaties is further undermined by law-making of the UN Security-Council,
substituting ordinary treaty-making on important issues such as criminal tri-
bunals or combating terrorism.15 Moreover, the complexity of the process
blurs the lines of responsibility between the actors in international regimes
and further threatens the functioning of the institutions of control and call-
back.16
The conclusion to draw from all this is that if we want to preserve a mini-
mum level of democratic governance, then we have to move beyond the State
and establish compensatory, transnational democratic structures.17 To that
end, models of cosmopolitan democracy have already been developed. They
are of course quite idealistic, if not utopian.
But this does not concern us here; as the purpose is only to point out that
the so-called “democratic deficit” is a global, rather than an exclusively Eu-
ropean problem. This observation is important in two respects: first, it puts
European deficiencies into perspective. These deficiencies are only one
(small) part of a more general trend. Second, it shows that lowering our
democratic standards and accepting the status quo in Europe is not a wise
course to take, because this could create an unfortunate precedent. The over-
all threat to democracy does require creative strategies, unless we are to give
up on the idea of democracy altogether.
1.4. European variations are justified
The preceding observation does not prevent the accommodation of suprana-
tional variations in democratic governance. On the other hand, variations
may not be deviations ad libitum, amounting to a deformation of democracy.
In this context two elements of European governance are decisive:
14.  See Stein, “International Integration and Democracy: No Love at first sight”, 95 AJIL
(2001), 489–534, on democracy-legitimacy deficits in the WHO, WTO, NAFTA and EU.
15.  The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9
Dec. 1999, 39 ILM (2000) 270 et seq., not yet in force, has been reduplicated and made com-
pulsory by SC Res. 1373 (2001), 40 ILM (2001) 1278 et seq.
16.  Scharpf, “Demokratie in der transnationalen Politik”, in Beck op. cit. supra note 12, p.
228, at 230; Goodman, “Die Europäische Union: Neue Demokratieformen jenseits des
Nationalstaates”, in ibid., p. 331, at 350; Kaiser, “Globalisierung als Problem der Demokratie”,
53 Internationale Politik (1998), 3, at 4.
17.  “Democracy within a nation-state requires democracy within a network of intersecting
international forces and relations. This is the meaning of democratization today.” Held, supra
note 12, at 232.
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– the “carrier” or the subject of democracy is multinational and not a
“people” in the traditional sense;
– European governance has a network-structure, consisting of horizontal lay-
ers and vertical segments. The network is formed by European institutions
and the Member States acting both within those institutions (as a part of
them) and outside of the EU. Democratic legitimacy potentially flows from
all layers and segments taken together, not from only one of them.
1.5. The 2003 Convention’s model of European democracy: Equality,
representation, and participation
Ideally, the preceding general considerations should have informed the
Convention’s Proposals on democratic governance. More concretely, the
Convention was guided by the Laeken Declaration, which spelled out the
Convention’s mandate. In Laeken, the question of how to increase the demo-
cratic legitimacy and transparency of the institutions was a central issue.18 In
reaction, the Draft Constitution’s Preface proclaims that the “Convention has
identified responses to the questions put in the Laeken declaration: ... it pro-
poses measures to increase democracy, transparency and efficiency of the
European Union, by developing the contribution of national Parliaments to
the legitimacy of the European design, by simplifying the decision-making
processes, and by making the functioning of the European Institutions more
transparent and comprehensible.” The following analysis of the procedural
and institutional reforms proposed in the Draft Constitution should reveal
whether this promise has been fulfilled.
Most remarkably, one of the few genuine novelties of the 2003 Draft Con-
stitution is the Introduction of a new Title VI “The Democratic Life of the
Union”. This title was not elaborated by a working group, but originates di-
rectly from the Praesidium,19 and in its final version also embodies propos-
als for amendment by Convention members reacting to the Praesidium’s first
draft.20 The new title contains three principles of democracy, which are actu-
ally novel, namely democratic equality, representative democracy, and par-
ticipatory democracy. Moreover, the title reproduces provisions found in the
existing treaties, but with more or less substantial amendments, such as Ar-
ticle 48 on the European Ombudsman. Most importantly, the new title con-
18.  Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union of 15 Dec. 2001, Part I: “Eu-
rope at the crossroads”, with the sub-title: “The democratic challenge facing Europe”. Part II:
Challenges and Reforms in Renewed Union: “The Union need to become more democratic,
more transparent and more efficient.” gov.be/europ/en_decla_laken.htm.
19.  CONV 650/03 of 2 April 2003, Praesidium, The democratic life of the Union.
20.  A total of 235 amendments concerning the Praesidium’s draft articles on the democratic
life of the Union were submitted (see summary sheet CONV 670/03).
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tains a general clause on transparency (Art. 49) and thereby highlights the
centrality of this principle for the functioning of democracy (see in detail in-
fra, 2.3.).
I will here concentrate on the new democratic principles. Article 44, the
principle of democratic equality, runs: “In all its activities, the Union shall
observe the principle of the equality of citizens. All shall receive equal atten-
tion from the Union’s Institutions.” This article is an important manifestation
of the Praesidium’s general philosophy with regard to the institutional design
of the Union. During the course of the Convention’s discussion on institu-
tional issues, the President cited three guiding principles on which all pro-
posals by the Praesidium during the Convention were based. The first of
these was the principle of equality of citizens and of Member States.21 The
fact that only equality of citizens is explicitly mentioned in Article 44 re-
flects an individualistic concept of democracy, and – in my view correctly –
leaves out the idea of equality of States, which is more a federalist than a
democratic concern.22 In the plenary debate, the idea of equality of citizens
was uncontested.23 Notwithstanding this grand formulation, equality of citi-
zens in relation to the European institutions is actually not realized in the
concrete institutional provisions of the Draft Constitution: the citizens are
not equally represented in the Parliament (infra, 2.1.1.), and in the Council,
only decisions taken by qualified majority must be carried by the majority of
States and by three fifths of the population (infra, 2.1.2.).
Article 45 enshrines the principle of representative democracy. This prin-
ciple does not figure in the Praesidium’s first draft,24 but was put forward by
the Praesidium at a later stage, taking into account Convention members’
proposals. The mechanisms of representative democracy might be usefully
complemented or modified by elements of direct democracy. To that end,
citizens’ referendums with regard to European laws were suggested by a
number of Convention members.25 However, the proposal to constitu-
21.  See e.g. CONV 696/03, Summary Report of the Plenary Session of 24/25 Aug., Presen-
tation of the new draft Articles, at 2.
22.  The most significant proposals for amendments by Convention members concerned the
introduction of the concept of “equality of Member States” as a complement, which was ulti-
mately rejected.
23.  See CONV 696/03 of 30 April 2003, Summary Report of the Plenary Session of 24/25
Aug., Presentation of the new draft Articles, at 5.
24.  CONV 650/03 of 2 April 2003.
25.  Kaufmann, Voggenhuber; Lichtenberger, Einem, Lamassoure (see the respective
amendment forms in european-convention.eu.int/amendemTrait.asp?lang=EN; on Art. 45 of
the final Draft: european-convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=3599&lang=EN; on Art.
46: european-convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=34&lang=EN (visited on 18 Sept.
2003). See also Verbatim Record of the Convention’s plenary session of 24 April 2003, at 32–
33, 37, 46, 52, 54, 57 (Athanasiu, Kirkhoe, Lamassoure, Meyer, Severin, Abitbol). www.
europarl.eu.int/europe2004/textes/verbatim_030424.htm.
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tutionalize the possibility of holding referendums was not taken up. (A dif-
ferent question is the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty itself by a Eu-
ropean referendum, which was even more intensely debated and which
likewise does not figure in the Draft Constitution’s provisions on ratifica-
tion). According to Article 45(2) Draft Constitution, the European citizens
are directly represented at Union level in the EP, whereas Member States are
represented in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers. This
clause introduces the Member States, which were left out in the previous Ar-
ticle, and reflects the common idea of dual legitimacy of the Union, based on
the citizens and the States (see also Preamble, final clause and Art. 1(1) of
the Draft Constitution).
Article 46 spells out the principle of participatory democracy. The pur-
pose of this article is, according to the Praesidium’s comment, “to provide a
framework and content for the dialogue which is largely already in place be-
tween the institutions and civil society.”26 Article 46(1) Draft Constitution
holds that the Union Institutions shall “give citizens and representative asso-
ciations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in
all areas of Union action.” This section reflects the ideal of deliberative de-
mocracy, which attributes much weight to the process of public deliberation
as a crucial factor of democracy (see also infra, 4.1.). The most tangible pro-
vision of the new title on democratic life, and actually one of the few real
novelties presented by the 2003 Draft Constitution, is the clause on the citi-
zens’ initiative (Art. 46(4)). The citizens’ initiative was introduced at a very
late stage upon intervention of two groups of Convention members.27 The
pertinent provision reads: “No less than one million citizens coming from a
significant number of Member States may invite the Commission to submit
any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act
of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution. A
European law shall determine the provisions for the specific procedures and
conditions required for such a citizens’ initiative.” The most important speci-
fications to be made in such a European law would be the number of Mem-
ber States required (e.g., eight Member States) and the minimum number of
citizens coming from one single Member State, in order to maintain a feder-
26.  CONV 650/03, at 8. The article was complemented, on suggestion of numerous Con-
vention members, by an article on the social dialogue (Art. 47).
27.  See CONV 670/03 of 15 April 2003, Summary sheet on the proposals for amendments
relating to the democratic life of the Union: Draft articles for Part One of the Constitution, Title
VI; CONV 798/03 of 17 June 2003, Summary Report of the plenary session of 5 June, at 3;
CONV 811/03 of 12 June 2003, Revised Texts on democratic life put forward by the
Praesidium, following consultations with the component groups and in the light of their sug-
gested amendments, with a view to reaching consensus at the plenary session of 13 June; Ver-
batim Record of the Convention’s plenary session of 12 June 2003, at 4 www.europarl.eu.int/
europe2004/textes/verbatim_030612.htm).
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alist balance. The citizen’s initiative modestly softens the otherwise strictly
representative character of European democracy. Independent of actual fu-
ture resort to that instrument, the mere option might become an important
symbol of genuine, bottom-up democracy. It seems apt to overcome the citi-
zens’ feeling of powerlessness vis-à-vis a gigantic European bureaucracy,
while at the same time preserving the Commission’s monopoly of legislative
initiative.
2. Institutional and functional aspects of European democracy
2.1. Composition and powers of the relevant European institutions
The Laeken Declaration stressed that the question of how the democratic le-
gitimacy and transparency of the present institutions could be increased “is
valid for the three institutions”, namely the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, and the Commission.28 In the following section, the democratic creden-
tials of the European institutions are examined.
2.1.1. The European Parliament29
In his presentation of the Final Draft Constitution to the European Council in
Thessaloniki, the President of the Convention found that the European Par-
liament was “the great winner of our Constitution.”30 We will see that this
assertion is correct.
2.1.1.1. Composition
Currently, the European Parliament (EP) is not composed according to the
maxim “one man – one vote” (see Art. 190 EC). The idea of “one man – one
vote” requires most of all that each vote has an equal impact on the election
result. This condition is satisfied in proportional electoral systems, in which
electors vote for a party list and where the seats are distributed according to
the distribution of the votes cast. In an electoral system of majority voting
(“first-past-the post”), the equality of the votes’ impact is guaranteed if the
relevant constitutencies are composed of an equal number of voters. If there
is no uniform electoral system at all (such as on the European level), the
28.  Laeken Declaration of 15 Dec. 2001, supra note 18, Part II, under subtitle 3.
29.  For an overview, see Kreppel, The European Parliament and Supranational Party Sys-
tem: A Study in Institutional Development (Cambridge, 2002).
30.  Rapport oral presenté au Conseil Européen de Thessalonique par Giscard d’ Estaing,
Président de la Convention Européenne, 20 Juin 2003, at 11 (european-convention.eu.int/docs/
speeches/9604.pdf, visited 18 Sept. 2003).
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equality of the impact of the votes and thereby the equality of representation
of the Parliament is not granted. A uniform electoral procedure, as foreseen
by the never-implemented Article 190(4) EC, is lacking. The “representative-
ness” of the EP is therefore distorted.31 Moreover, elections to the EP are,
due to the lack of a uniform electoral procedure and due to their connection
to national rather than European politics, only “second-order” national elec-
tions:32 they are not about past and future European policy choices, but
about the performance of national governments.
The relevant articles of the 2003 Draft Constitution are Article 19, which
foresees “direct universal suffrage”33 and a specification and completion in
the institutional part, Article III-232 (“Election of the Members of the
EP”).34 Article 19 of the Draft Constitution does improve the law as it stands.
It specifies that the EP is elected in “free and secret ballot”, and thereby in-
corporates two classic principles of democratic elections. It is, however, sig-
nificant, that the third classic principle, namely “equal ballot” is missing.
Also, Article 19(2) limits the number of MEPs to 736.35 Most importantly,
31.  Even leaving aside the extreme case of Luxembourg, the vote of one citizen of the next
under-populated country, Ireland, still weighs 3 and a half times as much as a German vote.
One German Euro MP represents 820,000 Germans; an Irish Euro MP represents 240,000
Irishmen, and a Luxembourg representative represents 7000 Luxembourgers; the European
average is 600,000 citizens per representative. Figures as of 1995, see the table in Føllesdahl,
“Democracy and Federalism in the European Union”, in Føllesdahl and Koslowski (Eds.), De-
mocracy and the European Union (Berlin, 1997), p. 231, at 234. Put differently: Germany has
21.97 % of the EU population and the country has 15.81 % of the seats in the EP. Luxembourg
accounts for 0.11 % of the population and 0.96 % of the seats. Ireland accounts for 0.97 % of
the population and 2.40 % of the seats (survey of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Neuss and
Hilz), “Deutsche personelle Präsenz in der EU-Kommission”, November 1999, reprinted in
279 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (30 Nov. 1999), at 29. See also the discussion and figures
in Karlsson, supra note 4, at 93–99.
32.  Katz, “Models of Democracy”, 2/1 European Union Politics (2001), 53, at 56.
33.  Art. 19(2): “The EP shall be elected by direct universal suffrage of European citizens on
free and secret ballot for a term of five years. Its members shall not exceed seven hundred and
thirty-six in number. Representation of European citizens shall be degressively proportional,
with a minimum threshold of four members per Member State. Sufficiently in advance of the
European Parliamentary elections in 2009, and, as necessary thereafter for further elections,
the European Council shall adopt by unanimity, on the basis of a proposal from the European
Parliament and with its consent, a decision establishing the composition of the European Par-
liament, respecting the principles set out above.”
34.  Art. III-232(1): “A European law or framework law of the Council of Ministers shall
establish the nessecary measures for the election of the Members of the European Parliament
by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in
accordance with principles common to all Member States. The Council of Ministers shall act
unanimously on a proposal from and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,
which shall act by a majority of its component members. This law or framework law shall not
enter into force until it has been approved by the Member States in accordance with their re-
spective constitutional requirements.”
35.  Art. 2(3) of the Nice Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union of 26 Feb.
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the new provision requires that “[r]epresentation of European citizens shall
be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of four members per
Member State.” This is a useful specification of the current provision of Ar-
ticle 190(2) EC, which only asks for “appropriate representation of the
peoples of the States brought together in the Community.” Moreover, the
new provision – in my view correctly – focuses on “citizens” as the relevant
starting-point of democracy, not on “peoples”. It also makes clear that the
principle “one man – one vote” will not be realized in Parliament, but will
continue to be curtailed by the opposing principle of representation of States,
which takes into account the federative nature of the Union.
Currently, the number of representatives elected in each Member States
for the 2004-2009 term is fixed by the Nice Protocol on Enlargement36 and
by Declaration No. 20 on Enlargement.37 The Draft Constitution only
slightly modifies the Nice figures in a Protocol on the Representation of
Citizens in the European Parliament, in order to accommodate an eventual
accession of Bulgaria and Romania.38 For the 2009 elections, the overdue re-
form of the electoral procedure must be effected. To that end, the Draft Con-
stitution asks for a “European law or European framework law of the
Council of Ministers.” The substance of this projected law does not deviate
from the law as it stands. As already foreseen in Article 190(4) EC, the
norms should stipulate either “a uniform procedure in all Member States or
[suffrage] in accordance with principles common to all Member States”.
Moreover, the “European electoral law” would have to be ratified by the
Member States (Art. III-232 Draft Constitution; see likewise Art. 190(4)
EC). It would therefore be, technically, a treaty under international law. To
sum up, the Draft Constitution’s improvements regarding the creation of the
EP appear rather modest.
2.1.1.2. Functions
Article 19(1) Draft Constitution for the first time clearly spells out the EP’s
functions: legislation (jointly with the Council of Ministers), budgetary func-
tions, political control, and consultation. In the following, those tasks which
are arguably most important, namely legislation and political control,39 will
be treated in more detail. As for the adoption of the Union’s annual budget,
2001 required only a total number “as close as possible to 732” MEPs (O.J. 2001, C 80/49, at
50).
36.  O.J. 2001, C 80/49.
37.  O.J. 2001, C 80/80.
38.  Protocol on the Representation of Citizens in the European Parliament and the Weight-
ing of Votes in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, CONV 850 /03, at 232.
39.  With regard to the EP, see Pescatore, “Les exigences de la démocratie et la légitimité de
la Communauté européenne”, 10 CDE (1974), 499, at 510.
48 Peters CML Rev. 2004
the Draft Constitution confirms the dual budgetary authority of the EP and
the Council, but greatly simplifies the budgetary procedure. It also abolishes
the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, which
was obsolete in any case (see Art. III-310 Draft Constitution). As regards
parliamentary consultation, the Draft Constitution’s requirements are similar
to present law.40
Legislation. During the entire process of integration, the EP’s legislative
powers41 have been strengthened steadily, most dramatically with the intro-
duction of the codecision procedure, established by the Treaty of Maastricht
(now Art. 251 EC). The weaker forms of parliamentary participation in legis-
lation are within procedures of consultation, cooperation and assent.42
Within the codecision procedure, parliament is an actual co-legislator along-
side the Council. Currently, the codecision procedure is required for legisla-
tion under more than 30 treaty provisions and extends, for example, to the
following important fields: anti-discrimination legislation under Article 12
EC, legislation on the right to move and to reside under Article 18 EC, provi-
sions on the freedom of movement for workers under Article 40 EC. Consid-
ering the text of the treaties, the codecision procedure appears to be the
regular mode of law-making. However, in reality only approximately 25 per
cent of EU legislation is adopted with the codecision procedure.43
40.  Law-making with consultation of the EP is provided for, e.g. with regard to the Union’s
resources, citizenship, competition, approximation of legislation, harmonization of indirect
taxation (Art. III-62), economic and monetary policy, social policy, environment, transport,
immigration, police cooperation, and for the conclusion of some international agreements (Art.
III-227(7)). The EP must be “informed” under Art. III-86(3) (Economic and Financial Com-
mittee); Art. III-76(10) (measures combating excessive government deficits).
41.  Cf. Craig, “Democracy and rulemaking within the EC: An empirical and normative
assessment”, in Craig and Harlow (Eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union (London, 1998)
33, at 35–43 (also published as: 2/97 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper (1997)); Crombez,
Steunenberg and Corbett, “Understanding the EU legislative process: Political scientists’ and
practioners’ perspectives”, 1 European Union Politics (2000), 363–383.
42.  Simple parliamentary consultation of the EP is foreseen in e.g. in Art. 37(2) 3rd indent
EC, and Art. 175 EC (random examples). Within the cooperation procedure (Art. 252 EC), the
Parliament may influence Council decisions by exercising its power of amendment. The scope
of the cooperation procedure is limited to Economic and Monetary Union (Arts. 99; 102(2);
103(2); 106(2) EC). However, under these treaty articles, no important legislation has been
taken. Therefore, the cooperation procedure is in practice negligible. Within the procedure of
assent, an Act cannot be definitely adopted without parliament’s agreement. Parliamentary
assent is provided for Acts concerning the European Central Bank and certain funds (Arts.
105(6); 107(5); 161 EC), in Art. 190(4) EC (uniform electoral procedure), in Art. 300(3) EC
(certain international agreements) and in Art. 49 TEU (accession of new Member States).
43.  According to EP statistics on legislative activities in the period from October 1997 to
December 2003, 1101 Acts were adopted upon mere consultation with the EP, 70 Acts through
the co-operation procedure, 460 Acts with the codecision procedure and 85 Acts with EP assent
(wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/ oeil/oeil4.FR211_en).
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The Draft Constitution’s provisions on legislation and on parliamentary
participation therein are Article 33 (“Legislative Acts”) and Article III-302.
Article 33(1) sentence 1 holds that “European laws [i.e. regulations in cur-
rent terminology44] and framework laws [i.e. directives in current terminol-
ogy] shall be adopted, on the basis of proposals from the Commission,
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers under the
ordinary legislative procedure as set out in Article III-302.” Article III-302
builds on the codecision procedure of Article 251 EC, but simplifies it and
accentuates the EP’s role as a genuine co-legislator on an equal footing with
the Council. The label “ordinary legislative procedure” promises that, under
the Draft Constitution, codecision has truly become the general rule for the
adoption of legislative acts. In fact, the current extremely confusing and far
from transparent variety of legislative procedures is in part remedied by the
Draft Constitution. The ordinary procedure is extended from about 37 do-
mains to about 80 to 90 subject matters (depending on how one defines
them).45 The list of exceptions (special legislative procedures) is limited to a
dozen subject matters which either have an impact on the Member States’
constitutional order (such as European citizenship) or which are politically
sensitive for some Member States (e.g. certain aspects of social policy).46
The new legislative procedure is based on the ground work of the Working
Group IX on Simplification,47 on which a broad consensus emerged in the
plenary assembly.48 The essential components of the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure are: (1) parity between the EP and the Council as the “two arms of
the legislative authority”,49 (2) the legislative initiative of the Commission,
and (3) (relative) transparency of the procedure.50 Technically, the present
codecision procedure has not been modified. Article III-302 Draft Constitu-
tion requires a (simple) “majority” instead of “absolute majority” (see Art.
251 EC) of the EP (in second reading: “of its component members”; in the
conciliation phase: “of the votes cast”). This is merely a verbal change. In a
vote choosing between two options, the majority is perforce an absolute ma-
44.  See Art. 32 of the Draft Constitution.
45.  Rapport oral par Giscard d’ Estaing, supra note 30, at 11.
46.  Id., at 12.
47.  See CONV 424/02, WG IX 13, Final Report of the Working Group IX on Simplification
of 29 Nov. 2002, discussed in the plenary session of 15 Dec. 2002. See also CONV 449/02 of
13 Dec. 2002, Summary Report on the plenary session of 5/6 Dec. 2002, at 1–12.
48.  CONV 449/02 of 13 Dec. 2002, Summary Report on the plenary session of 5/6 Dec.
2002, at 4. See also CONV 630/03 of 21 March 2003, Summary Report on the plenary session,
Brussels 17 and 18 March 2003, at 2.
49.  CONV 724/03 of 26 May 2003, Draft Constitution, Volume I – Revised text of Part
One, at 90 (Praesidium’s Comments).
50.  Cf. CONV 571/03 of 26 Feb. 2003, The Praesidium: Draft of Articles 24 to 33 of the
Constitutional Treaty, at 2.
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jority. As regards the scope of codecision/ordinary legislation, it is notewor-
thy that the procedure was extended to important subject matters in which
legislation is currently passed with weaker participation of the EP, including
the liberalization of services, intellectual property, common agricultural
policy, asylum and immigration.51
When assessing the democratic character of European law-making, it is
important to note that the real influence of domestic parliaments in domestic
law-making does not live up to the parliamentary ideal. In the Member
States, legislation is, in reality, dominated by the executive,52 which is often
dependent on expert votes about eminently technical issues, and side-stepped
51.  See CONV 727/03 of 27 May 2003, Draft sections of Part Three with comments, Annex
III, at 116 et seq.: List of legal bases for which the Draft Constitution changes the adoption
procedure in comparison with the present Treaties.
52.  In France, laws are made in a collaboration inégalitaire of the executive and parliament
(Pactet, Institutions politiques, Droit constitutionnel (Paris, 1998), at pp. 435–460). In En-
gland, it has been argued that “the efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described
as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers. No
doubt by the traditional theory, as it exists in all the books, the goodness of our constitution
consists in the entire separation of the legislative and executive authorities, but in truth its merit
consists in their singular approximation. The connecting link is the cabinet” (Bagehot, The
English Constitution, reprinted in The World’s Classics (Neuwied, 1936, 1st ed. 1867), at p. 9).
The English majority principle has as a consequence that the executive is supported by a very
strong parliamentary majority. This leads, according to Lord Hailsham, to an “elective dicta-
torship”, that is a situation in which the executive controls the legislative (Lord Hailsham,
“Current Topics: “Elective Dictatorship””, in 120 The Solicitors’ Journal (1976), 693; Barnett,
Constitutional and Administrative Law (London, 1998), at pp. 142–143). See on the division of
law-making power between government and parliament in other Member States part I 3 of the
Danish Constitution of 5 June 1953 (folketing and King); Art. 26 of the Greek Constitution of 7
June 1975 (parliament and president); Art. 34, 46 of the Luxembourg Constitution of 17 Oct.
1868 (archeduke and parliament); Art. 81 of the Dutch Constitution of 17 Feb. 1983 (govern-
ment and parliament); power to delegate from parliament to government in Art. 66 II and Art.
82 of the Spanish Constitution of 29 Dec. 1978; Art. 70 and 76 et seq. of the Italian Constitu-
tion of 22 Dec. 1947. See also the provisions in Art. 164 and Art. 201 lit. d) of the Portuguese
Constitution of 2 April 1976; Art. 18 of the Finnish Constitution of 17 July 1919/1994; Art. 36
of the Belgian Constitution of 17 Feb. 1994. On the other hand the Irish parliament has an
explicit monopoly of law-making (Art. 15,2,1 of the Irish Constitution of 1 July 1937); see also
Art. 24 of the Austrian Constitution of 10 Nov. 1920 (law-making by the National Council and
the Federal Council). Another case in point is the German practice of the Zustimmungsver-
ordnung, a system of law-making by the executive authority with the approval of parliament.
Zustimmungsverordnungen are issued in cases which are important enough to require parlia-
mentary participation, but which still need flexible and quick treatment. See German Federal
Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 8, 274, 321–322 (1958); German Federal Administrative
Court, BVerwGE 57, 130, 139–140 (1978). In most parliamentary democracies, actors not
belonging to the executive can hardly influence the legislative process in a significant manner
(De Winter, “The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation”, in Döring
(Ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York, 1995) p. 115, at 148; see
also Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments (Cambridge (Mass.), 1996), at pp.
3–4, 280: “Whatever else it might be, parliamentary democracy is not rule by the legislature.”
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by bargaining between the government and societal actors. But even taking
these factors into account, the EP’s influence on European legislation is still
less than an “ordinary” parliament’s influence on its domestic law-making.
Even with the codecision/ordinary legislative procedure, the EP is not the
sole or principal legislator, but shares legislative power with the Council.
Political control. Within the EU, executive powers are vested in the Com-
mission and in the Council. Consequently, one should expect parliamentary
control to extend to both institutions. An element of parliamentary control is
already present in parliamentary participation in appointing members of
other constitutional bodies. These creative powers of the EP are somewhat
underdeveloped in comparison to the parallel functions of domestic parlia-
ments. Under current Article 214 EC, the European Parliament must approve
the nomination of the President of the European Commission (made by the
governments of the Member States) and must also approve the nominated
Commission as a body. Article 26 of the 2003 Draft Constitution does not
substantially alter this procedure. Article 26(1) Draft Constitution merely re-
places the governments of the Member States by “the European Council”. It
specifies that the candidate for Presidency shall be elected by the EP “by a
majority of its members”. A novelty is the provision for a second round: “If
this candidate does not receive the required majority support, the European
Council shall within one month propose a new candidate to the EP, following
the same procedure.” Article 26(2) Draft Constitution formulates that the
President and the persons nominated for the College, including (this is new)
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the non-voting Commissioners
“shall be submitted collectively to a vote of approval by the EP.” The substi-
tution of the current term “as a body” by the expression “collectively” im-
plies no material change.
As for the Council, the EP has no influence whatsoever on its composi-
tion. However, in most Member States, governments are not formally in-
vested by their respective parliaments either.53
EP ex post control of the Commission is exercised by giving discharge in
respect of the implementation of the budget (Art. 276 EC; no material modi-
53.  See for France Pactet, supra note 52, at 414. In Austria as well, the president is elected
by the people (Art. 60 of the Austrian Constitution), the Chancellor is appointed by the presi-
dent and merely presented to parliament (Art. 70(1) and (3)). In England, the appointment of
the Prime Minister is a royal prerogative. Due to a constitutional convention, the Queen must
appoint the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons (Barnett, supra note 52, at
180). In Spain, the King proposes a candidate for the presidency after consulting parliament;
parliament has to grant confidence with an absolute majority (Art. 99(1) and (3) of the Spanish
Constitution); the rest of the government is appointed by the King on suggestion of the presi-
dent (Art. 100). See in terms of comparative government de Winter, supra note 52, at 115–151,
in particular at 147.
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fications proposed in Art. III-315 Draft Constitution) and by the discussion
of the general annual reports submitted by the Commission (Art. 200 EC;
Art. III-242 Draft Constitution) and by various other instruments.54 The most
important instrument of control is the motion of censure against the activities
of the Commission (Art. 201 EC). The Draft Constitution foresees the cen-
sure motion in a general clause in Part One (Art. 25(5)) and spells out the
institutional details in Part Three (Art. III-243). These proposals do not alter
the law as it stands. (A mere linguistic improvement is the term “majority of
its [the EPs] component members” instead of “majority of its members”.)55
The Council, on the other hand, is not legally accountable to the EP, al-
though it does function as part of the “European government”. The Draft
Constitution has not introduced any accountability here. It is even arguable
that such accountability would not only be unfeasible, given the current
power constellation, but even counterproductive, because Council members,
being members of national governments, must be primarily accountable to
their national constituencies. This link is now clearly expressed in Article
45(2) of the 2003 Draft Constitution, which holds: “Member States are rep-
resented in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers by their
governments, themselves accountable to national parliaments, elected by
their citizens.” In any case, the lack of accountability of the Council to the
EP is put in perspective by the observation, again, that – in fact – national
parliaments rarely make use of their existing powers to control their own
governments, for both political and technical reasons.56
54.  See Art. 197(3) EC, and Art. III-239(1) Draft Constitution (interpellation); Art. 230(3)
EC, and Art. 232 EC; Art. III-270(2), and Art. III-272(1) Draft Constitution (standing of the
EP); Art. 193 EC, and Art. III-235 Draft Constitution (temporary committee of inquiry).
55.  The censure motion was not discussed in the relevant Convention’s plenary sessions on
4 and 10/11 July 2003. The final Draft Constitution left the Presidency’s proposal (CONV 691/
03) virtually unchanged.
56.  In reality, in the Member States, parliamentary control is exercised by the parliamentary
opposition, not by parliament as a whole. Studies in comparative government show that, in
most European countries, the executive branches and the administrations have become increas-
ingly powerful and the activities of the opposition are hampered. Moreover, systematic control
is very costly and does not impress voters. As a result, parliamentary control is often uncoordi-
nated and fragmentary. True, it does reveal extreme and scandalous administrative behaviour,
but on the whole, real parliamentary control is minimal. Laver and Shepsle, supra note 52, at
281; also Majone, “The European Community as a Regulatory State”, V-1 Collected Courses
of the Academy of European Law (1994), 321, at 401; De Winter, supra note 52, at 147; Lord,
supra note 4, at 65.
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2.1.2. The Council of Ministers
2.1.2.1. The law as it stands
The Council of Ministers is the Community’s most powerful institution and
its primary law-maker (on parity with the EP). Council members are mem-
bers of national governments and enjoy some degree of democratic legiti-
macy via national elections. However, an electoral connection between all
Council members and all European citizens is lacking. Moreover, Council
decision-making appears to suffer from two major democratic deficiencies:
unanimity voting and an extreme distortion of citizens’ representation, run-
ning counter to the principle “one man – one vote”.
The normal modus of decision-making in the Council, especially in im-
portant issues, is currently by unanimity.57 Democracy, however, is normally
associated with majority-voting. Therefore, the current dominance of con-
sensual decision-making in the Union is often considered as undemocratic
and as a manifestation of the intergovernmental character of the Union, as
57.  The treaties have evolved as follows: in the original EEC Treaty, 47 articles required a
unanimous decision of the Council, 44 articles required a qualified majority vote and one ar-
ticle asked for a simple majority decision. After revision by the Single European Act of 1986,
48 articles required unanimity, 48 articles provided for a qualified majority vote, one article
required a simple majority decision and 10 articles required procedures of co-operation (com-
mon position of the Council with qualified majority, after rejection by the EP unanimity in
Council required). With the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992: 48 articles required unanimity, 48
articles required qualified majority, 16 articles provided for procedures of co-operation and 14
articles required a codecision of the EP, where the Council decides with a qualified majority
(former Art. 189 lit. b) EC, now Art. 251 EC), (figures according to König, Europa auf dem
Weg zum Mehrheitssystem (Opladen, 1997), at p. 74). Those law-making procedures which
involve the EP more intensely: procedures of co-operation (since the Single European Act of
1986 in Art. 149 EEC, after Maastricht in Art. 189 lit. c) EC, now Art. 252 EC – currently
applicable only in four cases, most notably in the field of the Economic and Monetary Union)
and the codecision procedure (Art. 251 EC, applicable in 31 areas) all require a qualified ma-
jority in the Council in all phases of decision-making (exception: unanimity for the Council-
decision after rejection of the proposal by the EP in the procedure of co-operation, Art. 252
EC). With the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, a new Title IV (Visas, Asylum, Immigration and
Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons) was created. Here, the principle of una-
nimity will remain operational for a period of transition of five years (Art. 67 EC). Under the
Treaty of Amsterdam, about 50 situations still require unanimity. However, those articles
which allow for majority-decisions are applied more frequently than those requiring a unani-
mous decision (König, at 87, based on empirical research for the period of 1984Bð1995). The
Treaty of Nice introduced decision-making with a qualified majority in 27 additional provi-
sions (either as a sole mode of decision-making or as an auxiliary mode). The procedures will
only in part be effective from the treaty’s entry into force. In part, they will come into effect
only at a later moment (see the list of provisions in the annex to Doc. SEC (2001), at 99). See
for a similar account: European Parliament, D-G for Research (ed.), Working Paper: Co-Gov-
erning after Maastricht: The EP’s Institutional Performance 1994–1999 (1999), www.europarl.
eu.int/workingpapers/poli/pdf/104reven_en.pdf.
54 Peters CML Rev. 2004
“diplomacy” in contrast to “democracy”.58 This is, however, misleading – for
two reasons. One is that – on the one hand – public international law is no
longer strictly consensus-based, but is becoming more and more
“majoritarian”. On the other hand, there are national democratic systems in
which majority voting is avoided. This type of democracy is called “conso-
ciational” or “consensual” democracy.59 EU decision-making, as it is cur-
rently carried out, could be interpreted as a type of consociational
democracy, and hence not as anti-democratic, but just as a particular form of
democracy.60 This might also be one direction for future developments, and
will be discussed further in the conclusion.61
Voting-power in the Council is not oriented to the maxim “one man – one
vote”, but rather to the principle “one State – one vote”, with slight varia-
tions in weighting (Art. 205(2) EC).62 Given the current apportionment of
votes per Member State, majority voting in the Council does not mean that a
particular decision is necessarily supported by a majority of citizens. If we
take into account that the national governments usually only represent a cer-
tain percentage of their national population, and if we further take into ac-
count the comparatively low number of Council-votes per capita in the
bigger Member States, a majoritarian Council decision may represent a mi-
nority of citizens. So if we want to ensure that – within the current system –
Council decisions are based on the votes of at least half of the EU citizens,
we have to ask for highly qualified majority votes or for unanimity.63 The al-
58.  Curtin, Postnational democracy: The European Union in search of a political philoso-
phy (The Hague, 1997), at p. 27.
59.  Steiner and Ertmann (Eds.), Consociationalism and Corporatism in Western Europe:
Still the Politics of Accommodation? (Amsterdam, 2002).
60.  Cf. Delwit, De Waele and Magnette, “Introduction: Vers un nouveau mode de
parlementarisme?”, in Delwit, De Waele and Magnette (Eds), A quoi sert le Parlement
européen? (Brussels, 1999), p. 11, at 18 (“un parlementarisme de consensus”).
61.  Infra section 4.2.
62.  One (German, British, Italian or French) vote in the Council represents 8.1 million
Germans (5.8 million British, Italians and French respectively). In comparison, one vote in the
Council represents only 1.7 million Finnish, 1.2 million Irish and 0.2 million Luxembourgian
citizens. Figures as of 1995 (see the table in Føllesdahl, supra note 31, at 234), but unchanged
by Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and Nice Treaty (2001) until 1 Jan. 2005. See also the discussion
and figures in Karlsson, supra note 4, at 93–99.
63.  If, for example, each of the governments represented in Council has been elected by 55
% of its voters, a Council-decision taken with a qualified majority is supported only by 0.55
times 71.3 %, which means by 39.32 % of the voters. If the majority-coalition consists mostly
of the smaller Member States, which have a much higher voting power in Council than their
proportion of the EU-population, it is possible that 71.3 % of the Council’s votes will not even
represent 30 % of the voters (Vaubel, “Die Macht der europäischen Mehrheiten”, 139 Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung (17 June 2000) 15, columns 2–3). It is difficult to object to this
calculation by arguing that a member of Government does not only represent his electors but all
his people, because this does not correspond to the reality of client-oriented politics. Vaubel
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ternative is the scheme of double majority-voting (requiring a majority of
States plus a majority of citizens), which will be discussed below (2.1.2.).
2.1.2.2. Reforms by the Draft Constitution
Article 22(3) Draft Constitution makes qualified majority voting the deci-
sion-making rule (“except where the Constitution provides otherwise”). This
means that within the new “ordinary legislative procedure” under Article III-
302 Draft Constitution, as described above, qualified majority voting ap-
plies. The scope of qualified majority voting has been extended from about
35 to about 70 policy areas. Most importantly, issues from the former third
pillar, such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police cooperation
etc. have been removed from the unanimity zone. The most significant re-
maining exceptions to qualified majority voting are in the CFSP sector, the
harmonization of indirect taxes, and some types of international agree-
ments,64 where unanimity voting has been preserved.
Any evaluation of the Draft Constitution’s extension of majority voting in
the Council of Ministers rests on a general assessment of the pros and cons
of unanimity voting. From the perspective of utility, the main concern today
– with the prospect of enlargement of the Union – is that unanimity is cum-
bersome and is more impracticable the more members there are in the Coun-
cil. From the perspective of legitimacy, however, it has been argued that an
extension of the majority principle within the Council – which is desirable
for practical reasons – would aggravate the democratic deficit65 for two rea-
sons: first, because in a system of majority voting, the defeated nation’s pref-
erences (which have been determined through a democratic procedure)
would be completely ignored; second, because a minister defeated in the vote
is not legally responsible for the majority decision and need not defend it at
home.
This proposition appears to be formally correct but, it is submitted, does
not sufficiently take into account the real process of decision-making. In the
author’s opinion, the bargaining modus of consensual decision-making be-
hind closed doors always allows the agents to neglect their constituencies’
preferences to a certain extent as well, if this appears opportune. Moreover,
national parliaments have difficulties in exercising parliamentary control
over “their” member of government. It therefore seems to matter less
continues: “If you want to make sure that at least half of the EU-electors stand behind a law-
making of the Council you have to ask for a qualified majority of more than 90% or unanim-
ity.” (Translation by the author).
64.  See Art. III-217(4); Art. III-225(9) Draft Constitution.
65.  Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, 100 The Yale Law Journal (1991), 2403, at
2473; Kielmannsegg, “Integration und Demokratie”, in Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (Eds.),
Europäische Integration (Opladen, 1996), p. 47, at 52.
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whether they have formal powers in that respect or not. For these reasons, as-
serting that veto power is the “most legitimating element”66 in the process of
decision-making seems exaggerated.67
Instead, we have to make a trade-off between the advantages of consensual
decision-making and the advantages of majority-voting. Re-phrased in terms
of constitutional economics, the “calculus of consent” (Gordon Tullock and
James M. Buchanan) consists in balancing two types of costs against each
other:68 The “internal” costs of the consensus-principle in the form of delays,
of not reaching a decision at all or of representing only the lowest common
denominator, against the “external” costs of majoritarian decision-making in
the form of burdening the minority, provocation of societal tensions, and so
on.69 This roughly means that the more important the issue is (which equals
high external costs for the minority), the higher internal costs we have to tol-
erate. And this means that fundamental issues have to be decided by consen-
sus or by a qualified majority.70
The upshot is that we should not simply propagate the broad use of the
majority principle, but design a nuanced system in which consensus and ma-
jority-voting are combined. Such a combination is – by the way – the current
reality in domestic democracies, because there the formal majority voting
procedures are completed by informal bargaining, and hence consensual,
mechanisms.71 Considering all this, the expansion of majority voting in the
Draft Constitution, although it still leaves out certain politically sensitive is-
sues, is an improvement.
The 2003 Draft Constitution substitutes the current weighting of votes by
the requirement of a double majority. The idea of a double majority has been
discussed in academic literature long before Amsterdam.72 It was, during
66.  Weiler, supra note 65, at 2473.
67.  Karl Kaiser calls the idea of preserving legitimacy by unanimity as “an effective facade
that conceals the ongoing erosion of democratic control over increasingly important matters”
(Kaiser, “Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process”, 25 International
Organization (1971), 706, at 715).
68.  Seminal in this regard is Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, 1962); see also Mueller, Public Choice
II (Cambridge, 1989), at pp. 43–176. Application to the EC/EU by Vibert, Europe: A Constitu-
tion for the Millennium (Dartmouth, 1995), at pp. 129–149.
69.  Terms used by Buchanan and Tullock, supra note 68, at 43–46, see also at 96 and 249.
70.  This was already advanced by Rousseau, see Du contrat social (1762), Livre IV,
Chapitre II, at 154: “Deux maximes générales peuvent servir à régler ces rapports: l’une, que
plus les déliberations sont importantes et graves, plus l’avis qui l’emporte doit approcher de
l’unanimité; l’autre, que plus l’affaire agitée exige de célérité, plus on doit resserer la
différence préscrite dans le partage des avis; ... c’est sur leur combinaison que s’établissent les
meilleurs rapports qu’on peut donner à la pluralité pour prononcer.”
71.  Cf. Benz, supra note 9, at 100 and 83.
72.  See, e.g. Vibert, supra note 68, at 131, 136–137, 147.
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that intergovernmental conference, officially acknowledged as one future op-
tion of reform of the Council’s decision-making after the Union’s enlarge-
ment.73 The concept has only very roughly been taken over by the Treaty of
Nice which foresees that from 1 January 2005 on, a member of the Council
may request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified
majority represent at least 62 % of the total population of the Union. If that
condition is shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall, ac-
cording to the Nice Protocol on Enlargement, not be adopted.74 That right to
request a check of the representativeness of the Council decision in terms of
numbers of citizens was taken up by the Convention without modification,
but limited to the period from 1 January 2005 until 1 November 2009.75 In
that period, the apportionment of votes to the Member States will remain
identical to that foreseen in the relevant Nice Protocol.76 After that date, Ar-
ticle 24(1) and (3) Draft Constitution stipulate that, “[w]hen the European
Council or the Council of Ministers takes decisions by qualified majority,
such a majority shall consist of the majority of Member States, representing
at least three fifths of the population of the Union.” This double majority
completely replaces the previous system of weighted votes. One state has
one vote, and the citizens come in via the “demographic safety net” of three
fifths, that is a 60 per cent requirement. This definition of the qualified ma-
jority was a major issue of debate in the Convention. One reason for the con-
troversy was that the scheme of double majority in the Council reduces the
influence of powerful, but lesser populated Member States, such as France
and notably Spain.77 But this reduction is an important step towards a fair
representation of citizens, who are the basic unit of any democratic regime.
The requirement of double majority is laudable for two reasons. First, it is
73.  Art. 1 of the Amsterdam Protocol (No. 7) on the institutions with the prospect of en-
largement of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty
establishing the European Community, mentions as reform options either new weighting of the
votes in the Council or the introduction of a dual majority (O.J. 1997, C 340/111). The mandate
for the IGC in Nice in the Presidency Conclusions of Cologne of 3/4 June 1999, para 53, was to
cover the “weighting of votes in the Council (re-weighting, introduction of a dual majority and
threshold for qualified-majority decision-making).” (europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/
june99_en.htm).
74.  Art. 3 of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union, Annex 1 of the Treaty
of Nice of 26 Feb. 2001 (O.J. 2001, C 80/49).
75.  Art. 2 of the Protocol on the Representation of Citizens in the European Parliament and
the Weighting of Votes in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, CONV 850 /03,
at 232.
76.  Supra note 74. The sole modification by the Draft Constitution is that the weighting
now also applies to the European Council when (only when) it decides by qualified majority
(and not only to the Council of Ministers).
77.  Note that Spain with 40 million inhabitants now has 27 votes in the Council, whereas
Germany with 82 million inhabitants has only 29 votes.
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simple and comprehensible for the public. Second, it reflects the fact that the
Council is currently both the federal organ in the EU (representing the Mem-
ber States) and – besides the Parliament – an important representative of the
citizens. The introduction of the double majority is therefore an important
constitutional step forward.
2.1.3. The Commission
2.1.3.1. The law as it stands
The main democratic problem of the Commission is the lack of transparency
in its decision-making.78 This is most relevant where the Commission acts as
a real legislator, as it may upon delegation by the Council (Art. 202 EC, third
indent). The law-making procedures of the Commission are notorious as
“comitology”. These “comitology” procedures79 are problematic from a
democratic point of view. First, the choice of type of committee is inconsis-
tent and therefore hardly predictable for the affected citizen. Second, the EP
is not actively involved and barely informed about the committee proceed-
ings. Finally, individual access to Committee documents was not granted be-
fore 1999. The Council’s comitology decision of that year,80 which
thoroughly reformed comitology proceedings, sought to improve in particu-
lar the aspects just mentioned and constitutes a step in the right direction.
2.1.3.2. The Draft Constitution’s Provisions
The 2003 Draft Constitution creates a new category of legislation: delegated
78.  There are of further aspects of democracy, such as the composition of the Commission.
The Draft Constitution suggests a “College”, limited to the President, the Union Minister of
Foreign Affairs/Vice-President, and 13 European Commissioners. Additionally, there would
be non-voting Commissioners (Art. I-25(3) Draft Constitution). However, the question of
democratic representation appears less pressing as the Commission acts in the general Euro-
pean interest and is completely independent in the performance of its duties (Art. 213(2) EC;
Art. I-25(4) Draft Constitution). Consequently, the Commissioners (voting or non-voting) do
not represent the Member States. See on the appointment and removal of Commissioners supra
section 2.1.1. (text at note 53). See on the general problems of majority voting (also practised
within the Commission under Art. 219(2) EC) supra Section 2.1.2. (text at note 54).
79.  Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down procedures for the exer-
cise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (Second Council Decision on
Comitology), O.J. 1999, L 184/23. See generally Kortenberg, “Comitologie: le retour”, 34
RTDE (1998), 317–327; Bignami, “The Democratic Deficit in European Community
Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology”, 4Berhoeven, “Towards a Legal
Framework for Executive Rule-Making in the EU?, The Contribution of the New Comitology
Decision”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 645–686 (“step in the right direction”, but “still too vague”,
ibid., at 686). See also case T-188/97, Rothmans v. Commission, [1999] ECR, II-2463, paras.
53–64.
80.  Supra note 79.
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regulation (Art. 35).81 This innovative element is based on proposals of
Working Group IX on Simplification.82 Delegated regulation concerns the
Commission’s legislative (law-making) functions, and not mere executive
functions such as implementation or enforcement of laws. The allowance for
delegated regulation does not actually take the place of comitology proce-
dures, but offers a different framework for them, which may in the long run
have an effect on their details.
Delegated law-making poses a democratic dilemma. On the one hand,
strict non-delegation is undemocratic to the extent that excessive detail in
Community legislation reduces transparency. Legal clarity, and thereby, de-
mocracy, is improved if Community legislation concentrates on basic issues,
leaving technical details to delegated acts. On the other hand, the delegated
legislation by the Commission enjoys a lower degree of democratic legitima-
tion, as explained above. It is therefore important that essential features of
the subject matter in question are covered by the European law itself. Article
35(1) Draft Constitution is very clear on this: “A delegation may not cover
the essential elements of an area. These shall be reserved for the European
law or framework law.” Such a guarantee of non-delegation is absent in the
present Article 202 EC. The new clause therefore constitutes progress in
democratic terms.
Democracy also requires that delegation is controlled by the primary law-
maker, that is by the EP and the Council of Ministers. The exercise of this
control must in turn be supervised by the ECJ, which is competent to deter-
mine whether the limits of delegated authority are overstepped. Article 35(2)
of the Draft Constitution leaves the specification of the control mechanisms
to the delegating law itself, and names only respective “possibilities”. Fi-
nally, the option of revoking delegation must be guaranteed. Article 35(2)
Draft Constitution allows that revocation of the delegation may be decided
81.  Art. 35 Draft Constitution: “(1) European laws and European framework laws may
delegate to the Commission the power to enact delegated regulations to supplement or to
amend certain non-essential elements of the European law or framework law. The objectives,
content, scope and duration of the delegation shall be explicitly defined in the European laws
and framework laws. A delegation may not cover the essential elements of an area. These shall
be reserved for the European law or framework law. (2) The conditions of application to which
the delegation is subject shall be explicitly determined in the European laws and framework
laws. They may consist of the following possibilities: The European Parliament or the Council
may decide to revoke the delegation; the delegated regulation may enter into force only if no
objection has been expressed by the European parliament or the Council of Ministers within a
period set by the European parliament. For purpose of the preceding paragraph, the European
parliament shall act by a majority of its members, and the Council of Ministers by a qualified
majority.”
82.  See CONV 424/02, WG IX 13, Final Report of the Working Group IX on Simplifica-
tion, 29 Nov. 2002, at 8 et seq.
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by the Parliament or the Council separately. This strengthens the position of
the EP.83
Without denying the democratic problem of comitology, we might put it
into perspective by two observations. The first is that, while comitology in-
deed eclipses parliamentary participation and public debate, it might enjoy a
different type of democratic legitimacy stemming from the fact that
comitology procedures allow diverse interest groups and experts to introduce
their views,84 even if not really in an even-handed, representative fashion.
The second observation is, that “the legitimation of secondary norms is an
endemic problem for all domestic political systems.”85 We should not judge
European governance more strictly than domestic law-making. Because a
concrete procedural regime on delegated regulation was not established in
the Draft Constitution (which would not be the appropriate place), the prob-
lems of lack of transparency and lobbying in comitology proceedings were
not and could not be solved by the 2003 Draft Constitution. This solution
must be found at the level of legislation, that is in the delegating laws them-
selves and possibly in a new general regime substituting the 1999 comitol-
ogy decision.
2.2. National Parliaments
The work of national parliaments in relation to the Union constitutes one ele-
ment of democratic legitimacy of European governance.86 This insight was
the starting-point of the Laeken Declaration’s concrete questions regarding
the national parliaments put to the Convention: “Should they be represented
in an new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament?
Should they have a role in areas of European action in which the European
83.  See considerations in CONV 724/03 of 26 May 2003, Draft Constitution, Volume I –
Revised text of Part One, at 93 (Praesidium’s Comments).
84.  This has been forcefully argued by Joerges and Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bar-
gaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalization of Comitology”, 3 ELJ
(1997), 273, at 285.
85.  Craig, “The Nature of the Community: Integration Theory and Democratic Theory”, in
Craig and de Búrca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999) p. 1, at 25.
86.  Current legal bases are: Protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaties establishing the European Community, the European Coal and Steel and the European
Atomic Energy Community – Protocol (No. 9) on the Role of National Parliaments in the
European Union, Art. 2 (O.J. 1997, C 340/113); Declaration No. 13 on the Role of National
Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the Final Act of Maastricht (O.J. 1992, C 191/
100). In the literature, see Katz, “Representation, the Locus of Democratic Legitimation, and
the Role of the National Parliaments in the European Union”, in Katz and Wessels (Eds.), The
European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration (Oxford, 1999),
pp. 21–44; on the constraints on the ability of national parliaments to represent the public at the
European level see Lord, supra note 4, at 56–59.
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Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of compe-
tence between Union and Member States, for example through preliminary
checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity”?87
Throughout the Convention’s debates, widespread recognition of the im-
portance of integration of national parliaments was evident.88 The results are
two protocols which provide for their more active involvement in European
affairs: the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments89 and the Protocol
on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.90
The first Protocol deals with information for Member States’ national par-
liaments and with interparliamentary cooperation. Commission documents,
in particular legislative proposals and the annual legislative programme
should be forwarded directly to the national parliaments (Arts. 1 and 2 of the
Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments). A six-week period must
elapse between a legislative proposal (as made known to the national parlia-
ments) and its adoption, subject to exceptions on grounds of urgency (Art.
4). This scheme is an important improvement on the current regime set up by
the Amsterdam Protocol (No. 9) on the Role of National Parliaments in the
EU, under which Commission proposals for legislation must only “be made
available in good time” to the governments, which may forward them to the
parliaments.91 Title II of the protocol, “Interparliamentary cooperation”, cuts
back the monitoring functions of the “Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees” (COSAC), but introduces the Conference’s task to “promote the
exchange of information and best practice between Member States’ Parlia-
ments and the European Parliament, including their special committees.”
COSAC is thereby transformed into an interparliamentary platform.
The Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality embodies one of the most innovative features of the Draft Con-
stitution, namely the “early warning system” with regard to observance of
the principle of subsidiarity. This system was suggested by Working Group I
on the Principle of Subsidiarity.92 Each national parliament or parliamentary
chamber may, within six weeks of a legislative proposal being issued by the
Commission, send the European institutions a reasoned opinion setting out
its concerns regarding an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity (Art.
5). Above a threshold number of one third of the national parliaments, the
87.  Laeken Declaration of 15 Dec. 2001, supra note 18, Part II, under subtitle 3.
88.  See, e.g, CONV 378/02 of 31 Oct. 2002, Summary report of the plenary session of 28/
29 Oct. 2002, at 4.
89.  CONV 850/03, at 226.
90.  CONV 850/03, at 229.
91.  Protocol No. 9, supra note 86, Art. 2.
92.  See CONV 286/02 (WG I 15) of 23 Sept. 2002, Conclusions of Working Group I on the
Principle of Subsidiarity, at 5–7.
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Commission is obliged to reconsider its proposal (Art. 6).93 The early warn-
ing system constitutes a new ex ante political monitoring mechanism trig-
gered by national parliaments which are thereby directly involved in the
European legislative process. The same monitoring procedure is foreseen for
European legislation under the flexibility clause (Art. I-17 Draft Constitu-
tion). This should empower national parliaments to keep under surveillance
possible tendencies to undermine the principle of enumerated powers.
On the whole, the Draft Constitution strengthens the legitimacy potential
of the national parliaments with regard to European democracy. Neverthe-
less, national parliaments’ direct involvement faces inherent limitations aris-
ing from the inevitable complexity of the legislative process. It remains to be
seen whether national parliaments will have the capacity to deal with more
than a fraction of European legislation. Moreover, tighter integration of the
national parliaments risks in turn aggravating the lack of transparency of the
process as a whole. All in all, national parliaments can most likely function
as European co-legislators and co-supervisors in only a quite limited way.
Their duty remains first and foremost to hold their governments to account
when they take decisions at a European level94 – a duty which they have in
the past not always been willing to fulfil.
93.  The relevant provisions of the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments are as
follows:
Art. 3: “The Commission shall send all its legislative proposals and its amended proposals
to the national Parliaments of the Member States at the same time as to the Union legislator.
Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and positions of the Council
of Ministers shall be sent to the national Parliaments of the Member States.”
Art. 5: “Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament of a Member State
may, within six weeks from the date of transmission of the Commission’s legislative proposal,
send to the President of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission
a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the proposal in question does not comply with
the principle of subsidiarity”
Art. 6: “The European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission shall take
account of the reasoned opinion issued by Member States’ national Parliaments or by a cham-
ber of a national Parliament. The national Parliaments of Member States with unicameral Par-
liamentary systems shall have two votes, while each of the chambers of a bicameral
Parliamentary system shall have one vote. Where reasoned opinion on a Commission
proposal’s non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represents at least one third of all
the votes allocated to the Member States” national Parliaments and their chambers, the Com-
mission shall review its proposal. The threshold shall be at least a quarter in the case of a
Commission proposal or an initiative emanating from a group of Member States under the
provision of Article III-165 of the Constitution in the area of freedom, security and justice.”
94.  See in that sense the chair of Working Group IV in CONV 378/02, supra note 88, at 3.
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2.3. Transparency and publicity
Although Article 1 TEU speaks of a Union “in which decisions are taken as
openly as possible”, one of the main democratic shortcomings of the Euro-
pean system of government is its lack of transparency and publicity.95 Trans-
parency and publicity of both political deliberation and law-making are
indispensable conditions for a functioning democracy. Without publicity,
citizens cannot give an informed consent to government action, they cannot
discuss or criticize it in a well-founded manner, cannot intervene promptly in
the political process and cannot attribute responsibility. In short, lack of
transparency impedes democratic control and oversight.96 Moreover, it
favours lobbying by well-organized pressure groups to the detriment of dif-
fuse interests.
2.3.1. The law as it stands
The issue of transparency has various aspects. One is the lack of transpar-
ency created by the sheer complexity of European laws, once they are en-
acted. This is, however, a problem for the rule of law rather than for
democracy. Another aspect is the question of individual access to European
documents. This concerns the administrative rather than the legislative level.
The individual right to access has been much improved by the Treaty of
Amsterdam97 with secondary law based thereon98 and by the Court’s case
law.99 Moreover, Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines
the right of access to documents as a fundamental right.
95.  See Commission, European Governance: A White Paper (COM(2001)428). The White
Paper was issued on 25 July 2001 and summarizes reflections on the reform of European gov-
ernance since 2000. The key-word is openness. See for a scholarly assessment the contribu-
tions in Joerges, Mény and Weiler (Eds.), Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the
Commission White Paper on Governance (Jean Monnet Working Paper Series No. 6/01) (Cam-
bridge (Mass.), 2001).
96.  Lodge, “Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy”, 32 JCMS (1994), 343–368.
97.  Art. 255 EC; special provision with regard to Council documents (Art. 207(3) EC).
98.  Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regard-
ing public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (O.J. 2001, L
145/43); Joint Declaration relating to that Regulation (O.J. 2001, L 173/5); Council Decision
2002/682/EC, Euratom of 22 July 2002 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, Annex II:
Specific Provisions Regarding Public Access to Council Documents (O.J. 2002, L 230/7);
Council Regulation (EC) No. 58/2003 of 19 Dec. 2002 laying down the statute for executive
agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in management of Community programmes, O.J.
2003, L 11/1, Art. 23 (“Access to documents and confidentiality”).
99.  Case T-194/94, Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v. Council [1995] ECR, II-2765;
case T-105/95, World Wild Life Fund for Nature v. Commission [1997] ECR, II-313; case T-
174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v. Council [1998] ECR, II-2289. See generally Broberg,
“Access to documents: A general principle of Community law?” 6 EL Rev. (2002), 194–205.
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But what matters most with a view to the functioning of the democratic
process is the general “active” duty to legislate in public and to publish legis-
lative materials.100 In the Union, the publicity of law-making was basically
only realized in 2002. While the EP has always deliberated in public, this
was not true for the Council. As for the Commission, comitology procedures
are still not public. The Treaty of Amsterdam obliged the Council, acting as
legislator, to publish the results of its votes, but not its deliberations (Art.
207(3) 3rd indent EC). It was only the European Council of Seville of June
2002, drawing conclusions from the Laeken declaration’s quest for transpar-
ency, which decided on an “open Council” policy.101 Implementing the con-
clusions of Seville, the new rules of procedure for the Council foresee that
Council deliberations on acts to be adopted in accordance with the
codecision procedure shall be open to the public.102 In other cases where the
Council acts in its legislative capacity, the results of votes and explanations
of votes by Council members, as well as pertinent statements in Council
minutes must be made public.103 The conclusion is that the Union has made
continuous progress towards enhanced transparency, but that deficiencies re-
main.
2.3.2. The Draft Constitution’s Provisions
Increase of transparency and openness was, in tandem with the general prob-
lem of European democracy, a crucial issue in the Laeken Declaration104 and
consequently a core task of the Convention. The Draft Constitution acknowl-
edges the centrality of the issue by introducing a novel transparency provi-
sion, Article 49 (“Transparency of the proceedings of Union institutions”),105
100.  Curtin, “‘Civil Society’ and the European Union: Opening spaces for deliberative
democracy?”, VII-1 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (1996) 185, at 259.
101.  Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 21/22 June 2002, Annex II. “Mea-
sures Concerning the Structure and Functioning of the Council”, Heading E: “Opening Council
meetings to the public when the Council is acting in accordance with the procedure for
codecision with the European Parliament”. SN 200/1/02 REV 1. europa.eu.int/futurum/docu-
ments/other/oth210602_en.pdf (visited on 5 Sept. 2003).
102.  Council’s Rules of Procedure, supra note 98, Art. 4–8.
103.  Council’s Rules of Procedure, supra note 98, Art. 9.
104.  Laeken Declaration of 15 Dec. 2001, supra note 18, passim.
105.  Art. 49 Draft Constitution: “(1) In order to promote good governance and ensure the
participation of the civil society, the Union Institutions, bodies and agencies shall conduct their
work as openly as possible. (2) The EP shall meet in public, as shall the Council of Ministers
when examining and adopting a legislative proposal. (3) Any citizen of the Union, and any
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State shall have a
right of access to documents of the Union Institutions, bodies and agencies in whatever form
they are produced, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Part III. (4) A European law
shall lay down the general principles and limits which, on grounds of public or private interest,
govern the right of access to such documents. (5) Each Institution, body or agency referred to in
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which is specified in the Draft Constitution’s institutional part in Article III-
305.106 Article 49(1) Draft Constitution clearly and correctly spells out the
telos of the concept of openness, which it took over from Article 1 of the cur-
rent TEU:107 the function of openness is “to promote good governance” and
to “ensure the participation of civil society.” To this end, the Union institu-
tions “shall conduct their work as openly as possible”. Given the intrinsic
link between transparency and democracy, it is sound to position the prin-
ciple of transparency in the new Title VI “The Democratic Life of the
Union.” It also makes sense that the new evocations of “participatory” and
“representative democracy” in the new Title VI likewise refer to “transpar-
ency” and “openness”.108
As noted, one facet of the European transparency problem is the general
complexity of European law. Consequently, a simplification of the Union’s
instruments and procedures was a key component of the Laeken Declara-
tion.109 Simplification improves the comprehensibility of the system and is
therefore one building-block for achieving “openness”. Thus, it has a direct
bearing on the level of European democracy.110 The Draft Constitution man-
ages to simplify Union acts to a significant extent. This begins with a radical
cut in the number of instruments, reducing them from the current 16 to five
types of legal acts. In particular, the Draft Constitution abolishes the coop-
eration procedure, which at present still exists in four cases in the area of the
Economic and Monetary Union. Also, the Draft Constitution establishes a
hierarchy of legislation, in order to relieve the laws from technical details,
which currently present a barrier to public understanding.
The second facet of transparency is, as said above, individual access to
documents. The Draft Constitution incorporates the Charter’s fundamental
right of access to documents (Art. II-42). This provision is almost literally
repeated in Article 49(3) Draft Constitution. The new clauses do not expand
paragraph 3 shall determine in its own rules of procedure specific provisions regarding access
to its documents, in accordance with the European law referred to in paragraph 4.”
106.  Art. III-305: “(1) The Institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union shall recognize
the importance of transparency in their work and shall, in application of Article I-49, lay down
in their rules of procedure the specific provisions for public access to documents. The Court of
Justice and the European Central Bank shall be subject to the provisions of Article I-49 para 3
when exercising their administrative tasks. (2) The European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers shall ensure publication of the documents relating to the legislative procedures.”
107.  CONV 650/03, Praesidium, Comments on the draft articles on the democratic life of
the Union, at 10.
108.  See, e.g., Art. 45(2); Art. 46(2) and (3) Draft Constitution.
109.  Laeken Declaration of 15 Dec. 2001, supra note 18, Title II, subheading: “Simplifica-
tion of the Union’s instruments”.
110.  This is the gist of the introductory statement of the Final Report of the Working Group
IX on Simplification of 29 Nov. 2002, at 1 (CONV 424/02, WG IX 13, at 1).
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the right of access as granted by Article 255 EC and the implementing provi-
sions. The only difference is that access to documents of agencies and bodies
created by the legislator is now guaranteed at the constitutional level, not
only by secondary law.111 According to the Convention’s proposals, the re-
gime of access will be regulated at three levels: First, at the constitutional
level, which makes openness the rule; second, by a European law laying
down the general principles and limits which govern the right of access (see
Art. 49(4) Draft Constitution), and finally, by the institutions themselves
which will lay down in their rules of procedure the specific provision for
public access to documents, of course in accordance with the relevant Euro-
pean law (Art. 49(5) and Art. III-305(1) Draft Constitution).
With regard to democratic governance, the most important aspect of trans-
parency is public legislation. Public law-making has, as we have seen, only
recently been partly realized in the sphere of the arguably most powerful co-
legislator, the Council. However, it is only granted at the low level of proce-
dural rules. This guarantee is constitutionalized by the Draft Constitution,
and extended to all types of legislation. Article 49(2) holds: “The EP shall
meet in public, as shall the Council of Ministers when examining and adopt-
ing a legislative proposal.” Under Article III-305(2) “[t]he European Parlia-
ment and the Council of Ministers shall ensure publication of the documents
relating to the legislative procedures.” According to the Praesidium’s com-
ments, the reference to the Council’s discussion (in the final version of Art.
49: “examining”) is intended to cover the entirety of the phase when legisla-
tion is under discussion.112 Consequently, it is the entire phase which is sub-
ject to publication.
On the whole, the Draft Constitution constitutes a step towards more
transparency and openness (although the relevant provisions in the Draft
Constitution are themselves somewhat lacking in transparency due to disper-
sion and repetition). The regime of individual access to European adminis-
trative files is more generous than in many of the Member States’
administrative law traditions and present rules. Most important is overall
transparency in the work of the Council, which is essential to allow citizens’
direct oversight and to facilitate and improve the active involvement of na-
tional parliaments in the EU.113
Perhaps, the Convention’s reforms constitute the maximum of achieve-
ment. Even excellent transparency regimes face inherent barriers to transpar-
111.  CONV 650/03, Praesidium, Comments on the draft articles on the democratic life of
the Union, at 10.
112.  CONV 650/03, Comment by Praesidium, at 10.
113.  See CONV 353/02 of 22 Oct. 2002: Final Report of the Working Group IV on the role
of national parliaments, at 3.
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ency. The first is that a certain degree of complexity, which inevitably causes
a certain degree of opaqueness, simply results from the fact that Europe is a
multi-layered and multi-sectoral political system. Many divergent interests
must be accommodated, and therefore a large number of institutions and
groups necessarily participate in the process. Another important factor is the
bargaining-modus of law-making. Bargaining (with package-deals, trade-
offs and so on) requires closed doors. If bargaining took place in public, this
would force the negotiators to entrench their positions and would render con-
cessions or re-definition of the problem much more difficult. If we open the
bargaining-arena to observations of the general public, actual decision-mak-
ing will evaporate into the corridors and lunchrooms.114 This means that
genuine publicity of the law-making procedure can be achieved only by re-
placing the consensual, “horizontal”, bargaining-modus with “hierarchical”,
majority-based law-making, but this in turn has its draw-backs, as already
discussed in the context of majority voting in the Council.115
2.4. Interim observations at the institutional/functional level
2.4.1. Diagnosis: Three functional deficiencies
The brief analysis of the governing institutions in Europe has revealed that
their creation, structure and procedures are less democratic than the purely
domestic systems of government in the Member States. A serious problem is
the lack of transparency in law-making processes, which means that a condi-
tio sine qua non for democracy is absent. The 2003 Draft Constitution prom-
ises substantial improvements in this respect.
Viewed in terms of functions, it might be said that the democratic problem
of Europe is, at least, three-fold:
(i) as regards the function of law-making, there has been a near-total transfer
of activity from the legislative branch to the executive branch: at the national
level, the parliaments have less and less subject matter on which to legislate.
At the European level, substantive legislation occurs only partially through
parliamentary procedures. The national parliaments’ loss of law-making
powers is in part compensated by parliamentary participation in European
law-making. Options for involvement have been improved by the Draft Con-
stitution. Moreover, the Draft Constitution has strengthened the EP as a co-
legislator through extension of the coverage of codecision (ordinary
legislative procedure) and by related procedural improvements;
114.  This is exactly what happened at the WTO conference of ministers in Seattle in De-
cember 1999, where developing countries were granted full access.
115.  Supra section 2.1.2.
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(ii) the second parliamentary function of controlling government is also im-
paired. The representatives of the Member States’ governments acting in the
Council are not controlled by national parliaments. The principal, but not
sole, reason for this lack of control has been the secret deliberation and vot-
ing in the Council. At least this serious barrier is completely removed by the
2003 Draft Constitution. The Member States’ governments are not controlled
by the European Parliament, because the European Parliament can not le-
gally – i.e. according to the scheme of the EC Treaty – hold the Council re-
sponsible. The Draft Constitution does not alter this. On the other hand,
parliamentary control of the Commission is granted. The Draft Constitution
does not provide for substantial modifications in this context. On the whole,
however, the Commission’s control is insufficient, because the Commission
forms only one part of the “European government”. Looking at the creation
and composition of the EP on the one hand, and its respective powers on the
other hand, a crucial point seems to be that there are no genuinely European
elections on European issues, fought at a European level, to install and re-
move European governments solely on the basis of political disagreement.116
This means that effective popular control of European government (consist-
ing of the Commission and the Council) via parliamentary elections or refer-
endums does not exist. This vacuum might in part be filled by the European
citizens’ initiative, which is therefore an important constitutional develop-
ment;
(iii) finally, there are democratic deficiencies at the higher-law level of Euro-
pean constitution-making, in the processes of amending and transforming
the European treaties themselves. European citizens hardly qualify as a
“pouvoir constituant” in this regard.117 The Convention method itself, which
was applied for the first time in 2003 without any formal legal basis, allevi-
ates this deficiency at the level of Constitution-making. The Convention
method is more democratic, because citizens’ direct representatives (mem-
bers of the national parliaments, members of the EP plus (without vote) MPs
of the accession candidates) held the majority of seats in the Convention, be-
cause the constitutional debate was open to the public, and because this de-
bate included a broad public hearing. The 2003 Draft Constitution itself
foresees the Convention method as a compulsory step in the procedure for
revising the Treaty establishing the Constitution (Art. IV-7(2) Draft Constitu-
tion). However, neither the current Convention nor eventual future Conven-
tions can formulate binding constitutional texts. They may only address
116.  Katz, supra note 32, at 56.
117.  See on this problem Peters, “Verfassungsgesetzgebung: Demokratische Legitimation
und direkte Demokratie – aus der Sicht der EU”, in Michel and Epiney (Eds.), Une constitution
pour l’Europe (Fribourg, 2003), pp. 93–114.
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recommendations to the governments with more or less de facto authority.118
Remaining shortcomings of European popular sovereignty with regard to
Constitution-making will not be further examined in this article.
My overall conclusion with regard to the existing functional democratic
deficiencies is that the 2003 Draft Constitution has definitely mitigated
them, in part dramatically. Moreover, if you compare the European system
(current and as suggested by the Draft Constitution) to the Member States’
democracies as they work in practice, the “deficit” is somewhat slighter than
it appears at first glance, but it undeniably still exists – even after the Con-
vention.
2.4.2. Possible responses
There are a least five possible solutions to the problem identified.
– The ostensibly “realistic” option considers the democratic deficit to be in-
herent in the overall European project, which was not, originally, even sup-
posed to be democratic at all.119 But this option of simply renouncing on
democratic legitimacy is foreclosed by the fact that democracy has, mean-
while, been acknowledged as a structural principle of the Union (see Art.
6(1) TEU; Part I, Title VI Draft Constititution).120 Last but not least, demo-
cratic legitimacy is required by Member States’ constitutions as a condition
for the transfer of sovereign powers.121
– The “resigned” option attempts to freeze integration at the current point in
order not to aggravate the democratic deficit further. This option is not vi-
able either, in view of the continuing mobility of production factors and the
continuing globalization of many kinds of problems, which can not be solved
within the framework of the nation State.
118.  See the Laeken declaration, supra note 18, Title III, subheading “final document”; and
Art. IV-7(2) 2nd indent 2 Draft Constitution.
119.  On the inherently anti-democratic méthode Monnet, see Featherstone, “Jean Monnet
and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union”, 32 JCMS (1994), 149–170; Burgess,
Federalism and the European Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the Euro-
pean Community, 1972–1987 (London, 1989), at pp. 44–55; Chryssochoou, Democracy in the
European Union (London, 1998), at 156. See also Laughland, The Tainted Source: The Un-
democratic Origins of the European Idea (London, 1997).
120.  Although the Treaties of Rome do not mention the term democracy, the principle of
democracy has been applied to the EEC at least since the introduction of direct elections to the
EP in 1979. See also recital 3 of the preamble of the Single European Act of 28 Feb. 1986
(europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr14a.htm); recital 5 of the preamble of the Treaty of Euro-
pean Union of Maastricht of 7 Feb. 1992 and finally recital 6 of the preamble TEU (Am-
sterdam) of 2 Oct. 1997. According to the case law, the participation of the EP in legislation as
provided for in the treaties reflects the community principle of democracy: see Case 138/79,
Roquette Frères v. Council, [1980] ECR 3333, para 33; Case 139/79, Maizena v. Council,
[1980] ECR 3393, para 34; Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council (Titandioxide), [1991]
ECR, I-2867, para 20.
121.  See, e.g., Art. 23(1), sentence 1 of the German Basic Law.
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– The third option is the genuinely “European” one, of strengthening the
power of the European Parliament in order to make the Union itself more
democratic. This strategy has been applied slowly but surely through the re-
forms of the European treaties. As we have seen (supra Section 2.1.1.), the
Convention clearly followed that path.
– But the genuinely “European strategy” is criticized by a fourth position,
which I will call the “fundamentalist” one: its proponents argue that Euro-
pean governance is inherently limited in its democratic capacity. The prob-
lem is – so the argument runs – not only one of parliamentary deficiency, but
a deeper one whose roots largely lie in insurmountable extra-legal deficien-
cies.122
– The fifth position, which is supported by this paper, argues that the Euro-
pean Union needs more democracy, and that it is in principle capable of be-
coming more democratic – but not necessarily via the parliament.
3. General problems of European democracy
3.1. The Subject of Democratic Legitimacy: The European Political
Constituency123
First, the “fundamentalist” assumptions are questioned.
3.1.1. No European “Staatsvolk” is needed
The first “fundamentalist” concern relates to the subject or source of a Euro-
pean democratic structure. This aspect is something of a malaise allemande,
as several German lawyers and theorists are concerned about the absence of
a European “people”, which would be the necessary carrier of a European
democracy.124 This position considers democracy and the nation State as cor-
122.  Kielmannsegg, supra note 65, at 58; in this sense also Grimm, “Mit einer Aufwertung
des Europa-Parlaments ist es nicht getan – Das Demokratiedefizit der EG hat strukturelle
Ursachen”, 6 Jahrbuch Staats- u. Verwaltungswissenschaft (1992/93), 13, at 13–14; Ossen-
bühl, “Maastricht und das Grundgesetz – eine verfassungsrechtliche Wende?”, 108 DVBL
(1993), 629, at 634; Schmitt Glaeser, Grundgesetz und Europarecht als Elemente Europä-
ischen Verfassungsrechts (Berlin, 1996), p. 216; Scharpf, supra note 16, at 233.
123.  This part builds on ideas from Peters, supra note 11, at 651–662.
124.  See extensively Augustin, Das Volk in der Europäischen Union: Zu Inhalt und Kritik
eines normativen Begriffs (Berlin, 2000); Kirchhof, “Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der
europäischen Integration”, in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), VII Handbuch des Staatsrechts der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Heidelberg, 1992) 855, para 33: “Democracy presupposes inte-
gration in a state Volk” (translation by the author). According to Udo Di Fabio, the concept of
the State and of democracy form an inseparable unit. Renouncing State sovereignty means
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ollaries, and has its intellectual roots in the political philosophy of Hegel, ac-
cording to which the individual can be free only in and by means of the
State.125 The response is that although nation states have historically been
the ordinary locus of democracy, there is no logical or necessary link. It is
widely acknowledged, – and has been at least since the 1970s – that democ-
racy is a principle of organization that is not reserved for states, but can be
applied to all kinds of societal structures. It is not therefore necessary to
have a Staatsvolk for a European State.
3.1.2. A European demos in statu nascendi exists
The weaker version of the Hegelian position just mentioned is located in the
quest for a “collective” that would be at least similar to the people of a na-
tion State.126 However, there is no European consensus on what the decisive
characteristics of such a collective body would be. On the contrary, we know
that there are divergent philosophies about what makes “a people” through-
out Europe. The most prominent conceptions of “people” or “nation” are the
German and the French ones. In a very simplified and abbreviated way, we
can say that the French tradition of la nation is based on a common political
will to respect basic political ideals (liberté, égalité, fraternité). As Ernest
Renan put it: “Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel”.127 The com-
peting German view of a “people” or “nation” focuses more on ethnic origin
and on common culture. Because it rests on elements which are “given”
rather than elements which can grow and which can be acquired, it is a more
deterministic and “closed” conception than the (ideal) French one. The point
to be made in terms of Europe is that if we rely on a “French” conception of
renouncing popular sovereignty (Di Fabio, “Der neue Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes”, 32 Der
Staat (1993) 191, at 200–201, 206, 203). According to Randelzhofer, the “democratic defi-
ciency of the EC cannot be overcome by empowerment of the EP, because the EP does not
represent a State’s people and certainly not the German People” (Randelzhofer, “Zum
behaupteten Demokratiedefizit in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft”, in Hommelhoff and
Kirchhof (Eds.), Der Staatenverbund der Europäischen Union (Heidelberg, 1994) 39, at 54;
translation by the author).
125.  Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Hegel, Sämtliche Werke Vol. 7, ed.
by H. Glockner (Stuttgart, 1928, orig. 1821), § 258 (at 329); see also Müller, “Von der Idee des
Staates”, in Müller, Ausgewählte Abhandlungen (Jena, 1921, orig. 1809) p. 3, at 5: “Man is
unthinkable outside the State” (translation by the author).
126.  Kirchhof, supra note 124, para 53; Ossenbühl, supra note 122, at 634; Grimm, supra
note 122, at 16; Di Fabio, supra note 124, at 202–203; Isensee, “Nachwort: Europa – die
politische Erfindung eines Erdteils”, in Isensee (Ed.), Europa als politische Idee und als
rechtliche Form (Berlin, 1994) 103, at 133; Kirchhof, “Die Gewaltenbalance zwischen den
staatlichen und europäischen Organen”, 53 JZ (1998), 965, at 972; Chryssochoou, supra note
119, at vii and 16.
127.  Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’, in Renan, I Oeuvres complètes (Paris, 1947, orig.
1882) p. 887, at 903.
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the “people”, we can already discern a European “demos”, at least in statu
nascendi. This theme has been elaborated by Rainer Lepsius, Jürgen
Habermas and Joseph Weiler,128 partly in reaction to the notorious
Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court.129
3.1.3. The carrier of democracy can evolve within democratic structures
By saying, “in statu nascendi”, the intention is to stress that the carrier of
democracy can evolve within democratic structures. The people or the sover-
eign, from whom democratic government ostensibly emanates, is not a pre-
political, natural entity. It is not the origin of a polity, but often a product of
deliberate nation-building.130 So it would be a-historical and unrealistic to
ask for an already existing European “people” as a pre-condition of a Euro-
pean democracy. It therefore makes sense that in his official presentation of
the final draft, the Convention’s President opined that cooperation between
the national parliaments and the EP should be organized on a regular basis,
so that a “European political constituency” might emerge, which would be
the first step towards a genuinely European demos.”131
3.2. Extra-legal conditions of a functioning democracy
Moving away from the “carrier” of democracy, the extra-legal conditions of a
functioning democracy will now be discussed.132
128.  Lepsius, “‘Ethnos’ und ‘Demos’”, 38 Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
chologie (1986), 751, at 756–757; Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe
Need a Constitution?’”, 1 ELJ (1995), 303 at 305–306; Weiler, “The Reformation of European
Constitutionalism”, 35 JCMS (1997), 97, at 118–122. See also van Gerven, “Toward a Coher-
ent Constitutional System within the European Union”, 2 EPL (1996), 81, at 84; Mancini,
“Europe: The Case for Statehood”, 4 ELJ (1998), 29, at 35.
129.  The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 89, 155, 184 (1993) –
Maastricht) searched for a “permanent legal link”, which is as tight as a people’s affiliation to a
State and which manifests an “existential commonality” (translation by the author).
130.  See the assessment of the formation of a unified French nation as a “political wonder”
already at the time of the French revolution in consequence of “the love of freedom”
(Révolutions de Paris, dédiées à la Nation et au District des Petits-Augustins, ed. by
Prudhomme, Paris, No. 20, 21–28 Nov. 1789, 2–3). In the literature, see Gellner, Nations and
Nationalism (Berlin, 1983), at 55 with the assertion that “it is nationalism which engenders
nations, and not the other way round.” See also Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since
1780 (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), pp. 80–100 (Chap. 3) on “nationalism from above”. From a dif-
ferent angle, Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, 1976, 1st ed. 1942),
Chap. 21 and 22, esp. at 263: “[T]he will of the people is the product and not the motive power
of the political process.”
131.  Rapport orale, supra note 30, p. 13.
132.  See in detail Peters, supra note 11, at 669–720.
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3.2.1. The democratic infrastructure
A functioning democracy needs a so-called democratic or participatory in-
frastructure, which goes beyond the organization of periodic elections. It
needs a common public sphere, in which political discourse over the com-
mon good can take place through political parties, interest groups, NGOs,
media and other forums. However, the European democratic infrastructure
(the “European public”, a “European public opinion”, European political
parties (cf. Art. 191 EC; Art. 45(4) and Art. III-233 Draft Constitution) is
quite weak, because the respective institutions are still more or less nation-
ally fragmented.133 For instance, the European Convention and the question
of a European Constitution were simply not an issue in the elections to the
Member States’ national parliaments which occurred in the crucial phase of
the work of the Convention.
3.2.2. Homogeneity and basic consensus
A different issue has been discussed – again mostly in Germany – in terms
of the polity “lacking homogeneity”134 (cultural, linguistic, political, social
and so forth) and “lacking basic consensus”. This discourse of “homogene-
ity” is objectionable for various reasons. One of the most important objec-
tions is that the quest for homogeneity bears the danger of homogenization
through unacceptable means, such as assimilation or exclusion. The infa-
mous dictum of Carl Schmitt in this regard is well known: According to
Schmitt, democracy “necessarily needs, firstly, homogeneity, and secondly –
eventually – the exclusion or destruction of heterogeneous elements.... The
political power of a democracy manifests itself in the fact that it can extin-
guish or keep away the alien and unequal, which threatens homogeneity.”135
The quest for homogeneity emphasizes difference and distance from the
“other” and ultimately boils down to Schmitt’s distinction of friend and
foe.136
133.  Cf. Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London, 2001), Chap. 7 (pp. 122–150) on “Cre-
ating an Open Political Class”.
134.  Offe, “‘Homogeneity’ and constitutional democracy: Coping with identity conflicts
through group rights”, 6 The Journal of Political Philosophy (1999), 113, at 119: A stable
democracy is homogeneous “because all (or at any rate the vast majority) of the people share a
commitment to the state and its democratic regime form, they are tied to their fellow citizens
through and understanding of the commonality of their fate and the recognition of equal liber-
ties, and they rank these commitments and loyalties higher than the various cleavages that
divide national society”. See also Katz, supra note 32, at 61: The higher the perceived level of
community, the lower the danger of majorities trampling on the rights or interests of others.
The lower the level of community, the more profoundly are interests likely to clash.
135.  Schmitt, “Der Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und moderner Massendemokratie”, in
Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923–1939 (Berlin,
1988, orig. 1926) 52, at 59 (translation by the author).
136.  Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin, 1932), at p. 14.
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The idea of homogeneity overlaps with the quest for a societal “basic con-
sensus”. The basic consensus is – so to speak – the homogeneity of opinions
on the foundational principles of society. It is considered as the pre-requisite
of a viable democracy,137 because the basic consensus guarantees the stabil-
ity of institutions, serves as a guide-line for deciding controversial issues,
and discharges politics on those issues where no vote is needed. The basic
consensus also triggers the famous “diffuse support”138 of the system by its
citizens.
The critical stance now is that because of the diversity of living condi-
tions, mentalities and traditions in the Member States, a basic consensus has
yet to emerge.139 However, in a secular and pluralistic society, a substantive
basic consensus can not mean agreement on absolute and ultimate values.
The basic consensus can at best be general and provisional.140 It is necessar-
ily vague and only partially articulated. Often it is only a negative consensus,
meaning that there is agreement about what is not acceptable. The basic con-
sensus is not necessarily rationally justified, but is a question of habit and
emotion. In this very general and relative sense, a European basic consensus
does exist. Public opinion polls show that the idea of democracy and of core
fundamental rights is approved by citizens throughout all the Member States
equally.141
3.2.3. The multiplicity of European languages
Another type of problematic “homogeneity” is the homogeneity of language.
The multiplicity of European languages affects European democracy in two
ways.
137.  See in detail Eisel, Minimalkonsens und freiheitliche Demokratie (Paderborn, 1986)
with further references. Siedentop, supra note 133, at 25: “Our object should be to create a
culture of consent in Europe.”
138.  Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965), at pp. 273–274.
139.  See e.g. von Bogdandy, “Zweierlei Verfassungsrecht: Europäisierung als Gefährdung
des gesellschaftlichen Grundkonsenses?”, 39 Der Staat (2000), 163, at 171–182.
140.  Albert, “Aufklärung und Steuerung: Gesellschaft, Wissenschaft und Politik in der
Perspektive des kritischen Rationalismus”, 17 Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und
Gesellschaftspolitik (1972), 11, at 25–26. It seems plausible to ask for respect for human dig-
nity and human rights, for democratic rules of the game and for an individual renouncement of
the resort to violence (Eisel, supra note 137, at 91–92).
141.  Immerfall and Sobisch, “Europäische Integration und europäische Identität: Die
Europäische Union im Bewusstsein ihrer Bürger”, 47 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (1997),
B10, 25, at 34 with further references. This basic consensus also seems to carry the diffuse
support of the EC/EU. According to opinion polls from spring 1999, only 74% of the inter-
viewed who support the membership of their respective countries in the EU believe that their
country can profit from this membership (51 Eurobarometer (July 1999) 27). That is to say that
many Europeans are ready to live with the EU even though they perceive it as a disadvantage
for their country. This can be seen as proof of the existence of a diffuse support.
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3.2.3.1. Barrier to a democratic discourse?
First, the formation of European public opinion and of democratic institu-
tions is certainly more difficult in the absence of a common language. That
is why John Stuart Mill already asserted, in his “Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government”, that “[f]ree institutions are next to impossible in a
country made up of different nationalities.”142 True, a functioning democracy
depends on informing the public, on communication between citizens and
the governing institutions, and on public debate and participation. All this
presupposes that communication is possible.
However, a uniform language is no conditio sine qua non for this. What
matters is a uniform space of communication, not of language. The space of
communication and the space of a common language are not necessarily
identical. Even within a single language-community, there need not be a
common discourse. Those German and Austrian citizens who read the Bild-
or Kronenzeitung do not participate in the same public discourse as those
who read the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung or the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
The fact that both groups speak German does not link their discourse. Con-
versely, a single space of communication can encompass various languages,
as multilingual democracies demonstrate. More important than a common
language seems to be a common media-scene in which European issues are
reported and discussed without focussing exclusively on the extent to which
a certain policy favours or prejudices one’s own country.
3.2.3.2. Barrier to a European identity?
The absence of a European language touches a second aspect, which is also
important for a European democracy. It is the question of a European collec-
tive identity.143 Some commentators consider linguistic diversity to be an es-
pecially important barrier to the evolution of a common identity. This
assertion is, however, based on an outdated theory, which exaggerates the
role of language amongst the multiple factors of identity-formation.144 De-
spite the absence of a common language, a common European cultural heri-
142.  “Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different
languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government,
cannot exist … The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach [the different
sections of the country] ... The same incidents, the same acts, the same system of government,
affect them in different ways ...” J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed.
by C. Shields (Indianapolis, 1958, orig. 1861), Chap. 16 (pp. 230–231).
143.  See Lord, supra note 4, 107–124; Teetzmann, Europäische Identität im Spannungsfeld
von Theorie, Empirie und Leitbildern (Göttingen, 2001); Siedentop, supra note 133, Chap. 10
(pp. 189–214); Pache, “Europäische und nationale Identität: Integration durch Verfassungs-
recht?”, 117 DVBL (2002), 1154–1167.
144.  Hobsbawm, supra note 130, at pp. 20–22; 54–63; 97–100.
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tage exists145 and with it at least a cultural, and to a lesser extent a political,
European identity. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau asserted as long ago as 1772:
“Il n’y a plus aujourd’hui de Français, d’Allemands, d’Espagnols, d’Anglois
même, quoi qu’on en dise; il n’y a que des Européens.”146 Although this
statement is in part wishful thinking, it demonstrates that at least among Eu-
ropean intellectuals a European consciousness has existed for a long time.
The question is whether this consciousness is shared by the population. In
this regard, opinion polls offer a mixed picture. For example, no specific Eu-
ropean characteristic (e.g. cultural or educational, religious or moral ) could
be named by more than 15 % of those Germans asked in April 1999 for Eu-
ropean characteristics. But 21 % said that Europeans do not differ from other
nations in the world.147 On the other hand, especially in Germany, the acces-
sion of countries such as Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic is wel-
comed, mostly (by 52%) with the argument that “they are Europeans and all
Europeans are supposed to be in the Union”.148 According to other polls, in
spring 1999, 56% of the those asked felt “very” or “pretty much” aligned to
Europe.149 Apparently, no clear self-image exists, only a diffuse, “irrational”
sense of “European-ness”.
This observation is countered by the objection that a further strengthening
of European identity would undermine national identities. The response to
this criticism is that individuals have multiple identities, for example as a
German, a woman, a mother, a Christian, and so on. European and national
identities are not competitive, but complementary. This is accurately ex-
pressed in the EC Treaty, which states that: “Citizenship of the Union shall
complement and not replace national citizenship.” (Art. 17(1) EC; Art. 8(1)
Draft Constitution). The affiliations need not be ranked in an abstract hierar-
chy, so European identity would not necessarily trump national identity. The
actual weight of the respective identity depends on the concrete circum-
stances. In some instances, self-perception as a European may be more im-
portant than national identity; in other situations the opposite will be true.
Multiple identities do not lead to a loyauté zéro150 towards the different com-
145.  See only Stolleis, “Das ‘europäische’ Haus und seine Verfassung”, 78 Kritische
Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1995), 275, at 279; also
Habermas, “Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie”, in Habermas,
Die Postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt a.M., 1998), p. 91, at 155–156.
146.  Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation
projetée en avril 1772, in Oeuvres Choisies (Paris, undated) p. 341, at 351.
147.  Noelle-Neumann, “Die öffentliche Meinung”, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration
(1998/99), 311, at 315 with more specific indications.
148.  Noelle-Neumann, supra note 147, at 316.
149.  78% in Luxembourg; 58% in Germany, 37% in the UK: 51 Eurobarometer (July 1999)
8–9.
150.  But see Sur, “L’état entre l’éclatement et la mondialisation’, 30 Revue Belge de Droit
International (1997), 5, at 10.
Democracy 77
munities; it is not a zero-sum-game. European identity does not grow at the
cost of national identity; what we are experiencing instead is an enlargement
of identity.151
3.2.4. What really matters
To conclude this part of the analysis, it will be suggested that homogeneity–
and identity-discourse does not merit further discussion.
3.2.4.1. The absence of fixed segmentation
The kernel of truth in the homogeneity-discourse is that majority-decisions
that also bind the minority will be accepted by the latter only if the members
of the defeated group can hope to gain the majority on another occasion. In
representative democracies, this is possible only if group-affiliations (e.g.
ethnic, religious, economic) are not so dominant that they determine the
votes of the group members in decisions on all subject matters. If they are so
dominant, we have a strictly segmented society which will not be democrati-
cally viable. So what matters is not “homogeneity”, but the absence of fixed
segmentation – the two are not identical.
Of course, European citizenry is divided by comparatively strong national
affiliations. But this is not the only divide. There are changing coalitions and
overlapping memberships in and between different groups: the opinions and
votes of citizens also depend on their political philosophy, which is trans-
boundary. Dividing lines may run between large Member States and small
ones, between industrial and agricultural Member States, between those with
high environmental standards and those with lower ones, and so forth. Con-
sequently, we have a relatively high number of sub-cultures, which overlap,
so that no dominating cleavages emerge. The more that European policy-
making proliferates and covers diverse subject matters, the more improbable
becomes the permanent marginalization of a specific group.
3.2.4.2. Cognitive and ethical capacities of citizens
If we look more closely at the idea of “European identity”, it must be admit-
ted that such a collective identity is not in itself a pre-requisite of democratic
culture, but consists in the virtues which ostensibly flow from it, namely re-
sponsibility, solidarity, a willingness to compromise, trust, and tolerance.
These virtues do not require a common identity. Solidarity, for instance, does
not only emerge via the opposition of “Us” and “Them”, but from compas-
sion for the well-being of other individuals. The formation and growth of
these virtues however, require citizens to have minimum ethical and cogni-
151.  Münch, Globale Dynamik, lokale Lebenswelten (Frankfurt a.M., 1998), at p. 308;
contra Schachtschneider, Res publica res populi (Berlin, 1994), at p. 1189.
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tive capacities. European citizens must, first of all, know something about
European society. This knowledge can not for the most part be learned from
books, but is generally acquired by living in society. Second, citizens must
possess a minimum ethical capacity152 in relation to this society. To give an
example: a Union-wide majority vote (in Council or in Parliament) on traffic
policies which burden different regions very unevenly appears to be unfair, if
the voters do not take into consideration the special burden of a transit coun-
try such as Germany or Austria. The reason for a lack of consideration does
not, however, lie in essential group-specific difference or other differences,
but in the fact that most European voters do not know the traffic situation in
a transit country from their own life-experience. Greater knowledge and a
better sense of responsibility would influence voter behaviour, but would not
determine the outcome of a vote.
3.2.4.3. A procedural, not substantive basic consensus
As regards the so-called “basic consensus”, it has just been argued that this
is – in any pluralistic society, and also at the European level – necessarily
extremely general. A procedural consensus, for instance on the validity of
the majority principle for the resolution of conflicts, is therefore perhaps
more important.153 To focus on cognitive and ethical capacities and on a pro-
cedural basic consensus, as opposed to homogeneity and a substantive con-
sensus, is not to pre-determine the outcome of political decisions. Only
open-ended criteria are appropriate for an open society.
3.2.5. All extra-legal factors can evolve within democratic structures
To finish the discussion of the extra-legal factors for a functioning democ-
racy, it is stressed that none of these factors is a natural, or absolute, prereq-
uisite of democratic governance – which, in other words, would have to be
present in full before government could begin. The cultural-societal factors
are not a priori factors, but we must reckon with their evolution within and
through democracy. Legal institutions interact with cultural factors. The citi-
152.  This minimum is the recognition of the universal principal of practical ethics, the
“golden rule”, which asks us to behave toward our neighbour as we expect him to behave
towards us (Matth. 7,12; Luc. 6,31; Tob. 4,5). See in detail Schrey and Hoche, “Regel, goldene
(I. Antike bis Aufklärung; II. Die goldene Regel seit Kant)”, in Ritter and Gründer (Eds.),
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie Vol. 8 (Darmstadt, 1992), column 450–464, with
further references, also on pre- and non-christian formulations of this principle.
153.  On the importance of a procedural consensus Fraenkel, “Historische Vorbelastungen
des deutschen Parlamentarismus”, in Fraenkel, Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien
(Frankfurt a.M., 1991, orig. 1960) p. 23, at 65; DeWiel, Democracy: A History of Ideas
(Toronto, 2001), at 3–10, 6, 142–179. For the EC/EU, von Bogdandy, supra note 139, at 181–
182.
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zens’ ethical capacities and public discourse enhance and support the func-
tioning of the institutions, but those institutions in turn are apt to improve the
democratic virtues and capacities of the citizens. Moreover, it is understand-
able that the average citizen becomes involved only when he or she realizes
that engagement makes sense. Correspondingly, it can be expected that citi-
zens will become interested in the EP and seek information about it when it
possesses real political power. In short, all extra-legal factors are dynamic
and the existing deficiencies are not an absolute impediment to a European
democracy.
3.3. The size of the democratic territorial unit
Some people fear that European democracy might fail because of the
Union’s sheer size.154 But a difference in kind seems to exist only between
those very small communities in which a popular assembly can decide and
larger ones which require a system of representation. Within a representative
system, no simple line can be drawn between large and “too large.”155 It has
been argued that even if the EU exactly reduplicated the system in the Mem-
ber States, it would still be less democratic than the individual States. This is
so because the impact of each citizen’s vote is diminished in relation to the
whole, and because the relationship between citizens and their representa-
tives changes when one MP represents a much greater number of individu-
als.156 But this argument reduces democracy to democratic input. Democracy
does not only result from citizens’ participation in decision-making proce-
dures, but also from the fact that decisions matter and have an impact on
their lives.157
Roughly speaking, citizens’ input is maximized in smaller entities, and ef-
fective democratic output may require a larger entity – although this is an
over-simplification. In smaller units, citizens can communicate more easily
with their political leaders, and institutions tend to be more responsive.158
154.  Schmitter, How to democratize the European Union ... and why bother? (Lanham,
2000), at 8–9; MacCormick, “Problems of Democracy and Subsidiarity”, 6 EPL (2000), 531, at
534–535.
155.  Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, 1989), at 217.
156.  Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht
Decision”, 1 ELJ (1995), 219, at 232.
157.  Scharpf puts this as follows: Both authenticity and effectivity of the citizens’ self-
determination must be guaranteed (Scharpf, supra note 9, at 27); already seminal is Scharpf,
Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung (Constanz, 1970), at 21–28; see also
Scharpf, supra note 4. Building on Scharpf, see Benz, Postparlamentarische Demokratie?
(Opladen, 1998), at p. 202; see also Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats (Frankfurt a.M.,
1998), at p. 236, on the input- und output-dimension of democracy.
158.  Dahl and Tufte draw from a detailed empirical study the conclusion that these positive
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On the other hand, a dissenting citizen can not easily voice his objections,
because social pressure is higher in a smaller unit. On the output-side, it has
to be acknowledged that there is no optimum size for a political unit in terms
of efficient problem-solving. Larger entities can specialize and have more
options for action. On the other hand, they are cumbersome. It all depends on
the concrete problem. In any case, neither the aspect of democratic input, nor
the aspect of democratic output, and certainly not both together, result in an
ideal size for a democratic polity.159  The sheer size of the EU may even be a
democratic advantage, because minority-protection and conflict-manage-
ment seem to be easier in a larger unit. In large democracies, conflicts are
not so personalized. This means that although there are more conflicts, they
are less apt to polarize society.160 In sum, the EU’s size is not a barrier to a
viable European democracy.
4. Conclusion: Beyond the 2003 Convention
In this paper, I assessed the quality of European democracy in the light of the
real, not idealized, state of democracy in the Member States, and in the light
of the global dimension of the problem. Anti-democratic effects of globaliza-
tion foreclose the “resigned” option of renouncing further democratization
of the Union. Seen in this context, the status quo of government in Europe
(before the Convention and the IGC 2003) appears slightly less democratic
than in the Member States, with crucial deficiencies in transparency. The
2003 Draft Constitution improves the democratic twin exercises of law-mak-
ing and control of government in a substantial, but not revolutionary manner.
Also, guarantees of transparency have been elevated to constitutional status
by the Draft Constitution. Moreover, the extra-legal factors of a functioning
democracy are present in nuce and can evolve in interaction with legal insti-
tutions. Finally, the size of the Union is no democratic problem as such.
Against this background, the prospects for the EC/EU are those of a semi-
parliamentary and semi-consociational democracy.
effects work only when the units are very small (in Sweden communities of less than 10,000
inhabitants (Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, 1973), at pp. 41–65).
159.  Cf. Dahl and Tufte, supra note 158, at 108–109, 135, 138.
160.  Dahl and Tufte, supra note 158, at 92; see already Federalist No. 10 (Madison), in
Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by C. Rossiter (New York, 1961, orig.
1788), at 83.
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4.1. A European semi-parliamentary democracy
Within a European democracy, the parliament will play a different and more
minor role than the traditional ideal of parliamentarism supposes.161 This
foreseeable evolution is not a specifically supranational one, but corresponds
to the general decline of parliaments. The weakness of the European Parlia-
ment is put into perspective by a fundamental modification of parliamentary
functions in the nation State. This trend has already been described by some
as post-parliamentarism.162 At present, national parliaments are far from sov-
ereign, to the extent that they are dominated by political party discipline and
coalition agreements. They are marginalized due to the predominance of the
executive in the legislative process and the powerlessness of the parliamen-
tary opposition. They are dependent on technical experts and are bypassed
by secret negotiations and the direct networking of individual citizens.
The theory of deliberative democracy has consoled us concerning the de-
cline of parliamentarism, as it stipulates that the democratic process is not in
the first place justified by citizens’ isolated acts of participation, but by gen-
eral accessibility to a deliberative process.163 Deliberative theorists argue
161.  Magnette, “L’Union européenne: Un régime semi-parlementaire”, in Delwit et al. op.
cit. supra note 60, 25–54, esp. at 32–33; Magnette, L’Europe, l’état et la démocratie (2000), at
p. 221; Coultrap, “From Parliamentarism to Pluralism: Models of Democracy and the Euro-
pean Union’s Democratic Deficit”, 11 Journal of Theoretical Politics (1999), 107–135 (argu-
ing for the appropriateness of a “pluralist” model of democracy, with emphasis on societal
interest groups and a fragmented governmental structure); Peters, supra note 11, at 754–758.
See also Craig, supra note 41, at 43–64, arguing for a “republican conception” of European
democracy, which takes seriously the “idea of a democracy based upon institutional balance”
(at 43).
162.  Andersen and Burns, “The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democ-
racy: A Study of Post-parliamentary Governance”, in Andersen and Eliassen (Eds.), The Euro-
pean Union: How Democratic is it? (London, 1996), pp. 227–251. The authors state “that the
conventional idea of popular sovereignty in representative government has been and continues
to be marginalized. Such government lacks the structural competence ... to deal with the
myriad of differentiated processes and governance challenges of modern societies. ... Monitor-
ing, overview, investigation, deliberation, decision-making is far beyond the capacity of parlia-
ment (and its membership), no matter how large, how capable, how well organized, how
specialized” (ibid., at 244–245). Therefore, a post-parliamentary system has evolved, which is
characterized by the prominent role of interest groups (as opposed to individuals and their
“territorial” representatives), the central role of experts, and the shift away from Parliament
into informal groupings and networks. “These forms [of governance] also realize, in a certain
sense, general cultural notions of democracy, namely the right to form groups or organizations
in order to advance or protect interests and the right to voice an opinion and to influence poli-
cies or laws that affect one’s interests or values” (ibid., at 240).
163.  Standard works are Dryzek, Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, 1990); Bessette, The
Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago,
1994); Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, 1991); Nino, The Constitution of
Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, 1996); Elster (Ed.), Deliberative Democracy (Cam-
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that the traditional two-fold role of parliaments – decision-making and
democratic control – is already and will be even further superseded (albeit
not completely) by public, deliberative mechanisms.164 The legitimacy of
law-making will stem from improved, representative deliberative networks
(such as committees of experts or NGOs), not primarily from parliamentary
activity. Public control of government will no longer be exercised by parlia-
ments, but through additional forms of institutionalized control.165 Such
supplementary mechanisms of control might consist of elected expert com-
mittees and – with reservations – also NGOs.166
This means that the legitimatory function of conventional voting and par-
liamentary elections is complemented and to a certain extent replaced by a
well-functioning public discourse and quality deliberation. This also means
that the function of parliament can and should be re-formulated. It might be
that parliaments are to acquire a new role as mediators of deliberative poli-
tics. They could become the “communicative relay”167 between citizens and
bridge, 1998). A collection is Bohman and Rehg (Eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on
reason and Politics (Cambridge (Mass.) 1997). See also (in part referring to Europe) Manin,
“On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation”, 15 Political Theory (1987), 338, at 351–352 and
359–360; Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (Frankfurt a.M., 1992), at 532–533; Dryzek, “Po-
litical and Ecological Communication”, 4 Environmental Politics (1995), 13, at 23; Benhabib,
“Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy”, in Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy and
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton (N.J.), 1996), pp. 67–94, esp.
at 68; Habermas, “Drei normative Modelle der Demokratie”, in Habermas, Die Einbeziehung
des Anderen (Frankfurt a.M., 1996), p. 277, at 284–292. More recent studies include Palazzo,
Die Mitte der Demokratie: Über die Theorie deliberativer Demokratie von Jürgen Habermas
(Baden-Baden, 2002); Thürer, “Deliberative Demokratie und Abstimmungsdemokratie”, in
Donatsch, Forster and Schwarzenegger (Eds.), Festschrift für Stefan Trechsel zum 65.
Geburtstag (2002), pp. 169–187. Application of the deliberative model to the EU: Curtin, su-
pra note 100, at 185–280; Curtin, supra note 58, at 53–55; Joerges and Neyer, supra note 84, at
273–299, esp. at 282; Joerges and Neyer, “Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative
problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector”, 4 Journal of European Public
Policy (1997), 609–625, esp. at 617–621; Habermas, supra note 145, at 154–155; Eriksen and
Fossum, “Post-national integration”, in Eriksen and Fossum (Eds.), Democracy in the EU:
Integration through Deliberation? (London, 2000), p. 1, at 15–21; Eriksen and Fossum, “Con-
clusion: Legitimacy through deliberation”, ibid., pp. 256–269; Eriksen, “Deliberative
supranationalism in the EU”, ibid. pp. 42–62; Karlsson, supra note 4, at 57–75, 227–249.
164.  Habermas, supra note 145, at 166.
165.  See, already, the Federalist No. 51 (Madison), in Hamilton and Madison and Jay,
supra note 160, at 320, 322. The seminal work for modern government is Majone, supra note
56; Majone, “Independence versus Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institutions and Demo-
cratic Government in Europe”, 1 The European Yearbook of Comparative Government and
Public Administration (1994) 117; G. Majone, Regulating Europe (London, 1996), esp. at pp.
284–301.
166.  See on NGOs as a functional surrogate for the lacking opposition on the global level
Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (London,
1996), at p. 198.
167.  Marschall, “Parlamentarische Repräsentation in der Informationsgesellschaft”, 45
Zeitschrift für Politik (1998), 282, at 294, 298–299.
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institutions, or be considered as a “symbolic incarnation of the locus of
popular sovereignty”.168 These roles are in part already fulfilled by the Euro-
pean Parliament and are strengthened by the 2003 Draft Constitution.
At the European level, one strategy that could complement parliamentary
activity would be the establishment of European referendums.169 Of course,
there are issues which are not suited to direct popular decision, for instance
policies involving the re-distribution of wealth. But resort could be made to
referendums selectively, in order to decide simple questions of constitutional
importance, such as defence or environmental issues. As already mentioned,
this proposition was discussed in the Convention, but ultimately rejected.170
At least a weaker tool, the citizens’ initiative, by which a significant number
of citizens may invite the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for
the purpose of implementing the Constitution, was introduced (Art. 46(4)
Draft Constitution).171
4.2. European semi-consociational democracy
Besides the semi-parliamentary nature of the emerging European democracy,
its second characteristic is its consensual or consociational nature.172 I have
already pointed out that the current dominance of the consensual modus of
decision-making in the Council can be interpreted as a manifestation of a
consensus-type democracy, as opposed to a majoritarian democratic system.
The Draft Constitution has substantially extended majority voting in the
Council, but has preserved unanimity voting in areas of high political sensi-
tivity, notably in the CFSP. Moreover, under the new scheme of double ma-
jority, a simple majority of citizens’ (indirect) support is not sufficient, but a
60 percent representation, hence a broader support, is required. This rather
high threshold was finally agreed upon, although the Commission and vari-
ous Convention members had opted for a simple majority of the popula-
tion.173
168.  Beyme, Parlamentarische Demokratie, supra note 9, at 544. See already Andersen and
Burns, supra note 162, at 248–251.
169.  Vibert, supra note 68, at 177–178 and 232; Scharpf, supra note 122, at 242; for the
constitutional level Pogge, “How to Create Supra-National Institutions Democratically”, in
Føllesdahl and Koslowski, supra note 31, 160, at 171–185; Schmitter, supra note 154, at 120–
125. See the empirical study on the use of national referendums on European issues by acces-
sion candidates and Member States: Hug, Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums and
European Integration (Lanham, 2002).
170.  See supra note 25.
171.  Supra section 1.5.
172.  Lord, supra note 4, at 46–54, esp. at 49; Peters, supra note 11, at 758–760.
173.  See amendment forms relating to Art. 24 of the Final Draft in european-
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Consociational elements of government feature more or less prominently
in countries such as Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Lux-
embourg. In an (ideal-typical) consociational democracy, consensual or
nearly consensual decision-making is the rule. All societal groups and mi-
norities are integrated into the political system. Government and other politi-
cal and societal bodies are constructed by proportional representation.174 The
drawbacks of consensual democracy are well-known. The most serious one
is the fact that the lack of real political alternatives provokes the formation of
populist and extremist groups or parties. However, a consociational democ-
racy may be appropriate for periods of transition, applicable in societies
which lack the prerequisites for the smooth functioning of majority rule.175
We have seen that the EU is in such a transitional phase, so that the consen-
sual model roughly “fits” in that regard.
Viewed through the lens of transnational consociational democracy, the
reduction of parliamentary functions is consistent. Those States which prac-
tise consensual democracy build consensus predominantly through extra-par-
liamentary channels, such as referendums. This procedure integrates
minorities into the decision-making process. Consequently, in order to trans-
form the EU into a consociational system, it would have to move beyond a
merely intergovernmental consensus and acquire a popular consensus. This
brings us back to the quest for complementary European referendums, which
was turned down in the Convention.176
4.3. A look ahead
The 2003 Draft Constitution continues on the well-known, unexciting path of
slowly, but steadily strengthening the EP and extending majority voting in
the Council. More radical are the suggestion to publicize the entire phase of
legislation of any type and the introduction of the citizens’ initiative. In par-
convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=417999&lang=EN (visited on 18 Sept. 2003): van
Lancker (MEP/Belgium); Einem (MEP/Austria); Olesky (MP Poland, (Berger (MEP/Austria);
Kaufmann (MEP/Germany); Papandreou/Katiforis (Greek Government). See for the
Commission’s position amendment form Barnier/Vitorino/O’Sullivan/Ponzano (id.), also
Press Release IP/03/611 on Commission discussion of 30 April 2003, “Commission examines
proposals for institutional reform ahead of next Convention meeting”.
174.  A seminal work is Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie (Tübingen, 1967); see also
Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One
Countries (New Haven, 1984), esp. at pp. 21–23, 207–208; Abromeit, Interessenvermittlung
zwischen Konkurrenz und Konkordanz (Opladen, 1993); Schmidt, Demokratietheorien
(Opladen, 1997), at pp. 229–252 (distinction between consensual and consociational democ-
racy at 242).
175.  Vibert, supra note 72, at 159–160; critically Katz, supra note 32, at 74.
176.  Supra note 25.
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ticular the latter reform proposal is a move towards a semi-parliamentary and
semi-consociational democracy. It may be objected that this orientation,
which implies a certain reformulation of the democratic yardstick, is in real-
ity a distortion which privileges the status quo, blurs further the already
blurry concept of democracy and sells an undemocratic regime under a mis-
leading, but prestigious label. My response to this objection is that a regime
may, without abusing the term, be called “democratic” as long as the various
interest groups have the opportunity to influence the process of decision-
making at any of its various levels, and as long as various groups can trigger
diverse mechanisms of control of the government – even if government deci-
sions may not be the expression of an electoral majority.
In any case, the label does not matter so much, because democracy is not
an end or a value in itself, but serves material objectives. From this perspec-
tive “democracy is”, as Winston Churchill said, “the worst form of Govern-
ment except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.177
The proposal to combine majority voting with consensual decision-making
and to supplement an inherently deficient parliamentary control by other, de-
centralized mechanisms of public control178 is intended to strengthen the
moral autonomy and self-determination of the citizens, to deepen their un-
derstanding of public affairs, to protect individuals’ interests and create a
pool of expertise. Because it seems both feasible and likely to generate at
least some of the above-mentioned positive effects, a semi-parliamentary,
semi-consociational democracy deserves consideration.
177.  Speech of 11 Nov. 1947 in the House of Commons, repr. in W. Churchill, His Com-
plete Speeches 1897–1963 (New York, 1974), at 7563, 7566.
178.  Magnette, L’Europe, supra note 161, at 222–227.
